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I. INTRODUCTION
Although a majority of general civil cases settle,1 settlements tend to
occur late, after discovery has been completed and close to the date of trial. 2
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs have been increasingly
adopted in federal and state courts3 as a way to facilitate negotiations so that
earlier and better settlements can be achieved.4
In most surveys, a majority of attorneys report having used an ADR
process in at least one case.5 But relatively few attorneys typically report
ISee, e.g., Jay Folberg et al., Use of ADR in California Courts: Findings &
Proposals, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 343, 357 (1992). These findings were based on a 1991
survey of 125 California state trial judges, plus interviews with 38 judges and 11 court
administrators in nine California counties. Id. at 346 n.1, 355 n.54, 365 n.104. See also
JONATHAN M. HYMAN ET AL., CIVIL SETTLEMENT: STYLES OF NEGOTIATION IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 26 (1993). The information discussed in the present Article is from the 1992
survey of 515 New Jersey civil litigators and 55 judges. Id. See also Herbert M. Kritzer,
Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 162-64 (1986).
2 See, e.g., HYMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 28, 39, 97 (noting also that most attorneys
and judges think cases should settle sooner than they do).
3 See generally SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE apps.
B, C (Supp. 2002); JUDITH FLNER ET AL., COMPENDIUM OF STATE COURT RESOURCE
MATERIALS 8-10 (1995); ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND
SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES &
LAWYERS 3-5, 14-17 (1996).
4 See, e.g., Bobbi McAdoo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact
of Rule 114 on Civil Litigation Practice in Minnesota, HAMLINE L. REv. 401, 409-10,
449 (2002). These findings were based on a 1996 survey of 748 Minnesota attorneys
involved in civil litigation, conducted after Rule 114 required attorneys to provide clients
with court-prepared information on ADR and to confer with the other side regarding
ADR. Id. at 411-12. See also Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law
to Increase the Use of Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 831, 834-35, 864 (1998). These findings were based on
interviews conducted from 1993 to 1995 with business principals and corporate counsel
in six large, national corporations and a review of their case files in business-to-business
disputes. Id. at 840. See also PATRICIA A. EBENER, COURT EFFORTS TO REDUCE PRETRIAL
DELAY: A NATIONAL INVENTORY 16-26 (1981); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN
EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT
xxvi-xxvii (1996). A full discussion of the effectiveness of ADR and other approaches in
achieving these goals is beyond the scope of this Article. See infra notes 219-22 and
accompanying text for a limited discussion of these issues.
5 See John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe
in Mediation, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 137, 169 (2000). These findings were based
primarily on a 1994 survey in four states of 70 outside counsel in commercial practice, 58
inside counsel, and 50 executives. Id. at 162-64. See also McAdoo, supra note 4, at 416
fig.2; Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The Challenge of Institutionalizing Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Attorney Perspectives on the Effect of Rule 17 on Civil Litigation in
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using ADR processes frequently.6 And attorneys' ADR use often is the result
of a judicial referral, a pre-dispute contractual agreement between the parties,
or a statute or court rule mandating ADR use in certain types of cases rather
Missouri, 67 Mo. L. REV. 473, 487 (2002). These findings were based on a 1999 survey
of 232 Missouri attorneys involved in civil litigation, conducted after Rule 17 required
attorneys to advise clients about ADR. Id. at 478-80. See also Morris L. Medley & James
A. Schellenberg, Attitudes of Attorneys Toward Mediation, 12 MEDIATION Q. 185, 188-89
(1994). These findings were based on a 1993 survey of 226 Indiana State Bar Association
Members. Id. at 187-91. See also Gerald F. Phillips, The Entertainment Industry Is
Accepting ADR, 21 ENT. L. REP., June 1999, at 5, 7 tbl.3, 8 tbl.4. These findings were
based on a survey of 75 entertainment attorneys, some working as in-house counsel and
others in private firms. Id. at 5. See also Bonnie Powell, Paper presented at the
Conference on the Reflective/Best Practices in Evaluating Court-Connected ADR
discussing The Georgia ADR Study 6 (Nov. 2000) (paper on file with author). These
findings were based on a 1999 survey of 525 Georgia State Bar Association members,
conducted when attorneys had an ethical duty to advise their clients about various forms
of dispute resolution and alternatives to litigation. Id. at 1, 3, 7. See also Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration: Innovation and Evolution in the United States
Construction Industry, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 65, 90 tbl.A-1, 132 tbl.AA-1 (1996).
These findings were based on a 1991 survey of 552 attorneys and a 1994 survey of 459
attorneys who were members of the ABA Forum on the Construction Industry. Id. at 83,
89, 129. See also Roselle L. Wissler, When Does Familiarity Breed Content? A Study of
the Role of Different Forms of ADR Education and Experience in Attorneys' ADR
Recommendations, 2 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L. J., 199, 220-21. These findings were based
on a 1995 survey of 1,299 Ohio attorneys in civil litigation practice. Id. at 219-20. But cf.
Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, A.B.A. J. August 1996, at 54, 55
(reporting that "fewer than half' of the attorneys had used ADR in the preceding five
years). These findings were based on a 1996 survey of 402 American Bar Association
members. Id. at 60. These and other ADR surveys discussed in this Article differed on a
number of dimensions (e.g., which ADR processes were considered, the attorneys' area
of law practice, when and where the survey was conducted), any of which could produce
differences in the findings that were sometimes observed among the studies.
6 See, e.g., Thomas D. Cavenagh, A Quantitative Analysis of the Use and Avoidance
of Mediation by the Cook County, Illinois, Legal Community, 14 MEDIATION Q. 353,
359-60 (1997). These findings were based on a 1996 survey of 54 attorneys in Chicago.
Id. at 354-55. See also Lande, supra note 5, at 222; McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5, at
491; Archie Zariski, Lawyers and Dispute Resolution: What Do They Think and Know
(And Think They Know)? Finding Out Through Survey Research, 4 MURDOCH UNIV.
ELECTRONIC J. L., app. A at 5 (June 1997). These findings were based on a 1996 survey
of 418 lawyers who were members of either the Law Society or the Australian Corporate
Lawyers' Association in the state of Western Australia. Id. at para. 24, 26, 44. See also
Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 90 tbl.A-1, 132 tbl.AA-1. But cf. McAdoo, supra note 4, at
467 (reporting that post-Rule 114, 64% of Minnesota attorneys used ADR in "most" or
"all" of their cases). These surveys did not distinguish between voluntary and compulsory
ADR use.
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than the result of a voluntary, mutual agreement by both parties after a
dispute has arisen. 7
Various methods to increase voluntary ADR use have been proposed and
adopted, including providing ADR information or education to attorneys, 8
encouraging or requiring attorneys to discuss ADR options with clients, 9 and
requiring attorneys to discuss possible ADR use with opposing counsel.' 0
Underlying these approaches"I is the assumption that certain factors operate
7 Voluntary ADR use tends to be low. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/HRD-91-38, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: FEW CLAIMS RESOLVED THROUGH
MICHIGAN'S VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION PROGRAM 6-7 (December 1990) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT]; Craig A. McEwen et al., Lawyers, Mediation, and the Management of
Divorce Practice, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 149, 154 (1994); Susan Keilitz, A Court
Manager's Guide to the Alternative Dispute Resolution Database, ST. CT. J., Fall 1990,
at 24, 28; JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY
NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 52-53 (1996); COLE ET
AL., supra note 3, § 6:4; Joshua D. Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: An Empirical Analysis, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1538 (1994). But cf
Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 111 (reporting that almost two-thirds of construction cases
went to mediation as the result of a post-dispute agreement). For a discussion of the
routes to ADR, see COLE ET AL., supra note 3, § 7:2; Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice:
Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577,
594-95 (1997).
8 See infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
9 See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
10 See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
11 These policies, and this Article, focus on attorneys rather than litigants because (a)
litigants typically do not initiate the discussion of ADR and (b) attorneys have a great
deal of influence on their clients' perceptions and decisions in the litigation process,
including the use of ADR. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 8; Gary Goodpaster,
Lawsuits as Negotiations, 8 NEGOT. J. 221, 223 (1992); Milton Heumann & Jonathan M.
Hyman, Negotiation Methods and Litigation Settlement Methods in New Jersey: "You
Can't Always Get What You Want," 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 253, 254 (1997).
These findings were based on a 1992 survey of 515 New Jersey civil litigators. Id. at 260
n.13. See also John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform
Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 879-80, 889-92 (1997); McAdoo, supra note
4, at 425; McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 497-98; Barbara McAdoo & Nancy
Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place on the Lawyer's Philosophical Map?, 18
HAMLINE J. PUBLIC L. & POL'Y 376, 391 (1997); Jessica Pearson et al., The Decision to
Mediate: Profiles of Individuals Who Accept and Reject the Opportunity to Mediate
Contested Child Custody and Visitation Issues, J. DIVORCE, Fall/Winter 1982, at 17, 29;
Roselle L. Wissler et al., Resolving Libel Disputes Out of Court: The Libel Dispute
Resolution Program, in REFORMING LIBEL LAW 286, 295-96, 306 (John Soloski &
Randall P. Bezanson eds., 1992). Accordingly, attorneys' acceptance of and support for
ADR is critical to its utilization and impact. See, e.g., Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Why
Attorneys Support Mandatory Mediation, 82 JUDICATURE 224, 231 (1999); Julie
Macfarlane, Culture Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected
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as barriers that constrain attorneys from regularly considering and using
ADR processes. Commonly cited impediments include attorneys' lack of
knowledge about ADR processes, attorneys' unfavorable views of ADR,
attorneys' concerns that proposing ADR will be seen as a "sign of
weakness," the routines and economics of law practice, and the lack of
judicial involvement. 12
Little empirical research has been conducted to explore how frequently
attorneys voluntarily discuss ADR options with clients and opposing counsel
when not explicitly required to do so by contract, court rule, or ethical
code. 13 There also has been little empirical examination of the factors
thought to act as barriers in order to ascertain how widespread they are and
what impact they have on attorneys' discussion and use of ADR.
The present Article reports the findings of an empirical study involving a
survey of Arizona civil litigators that examines these issues. Section II of this
Article reviews the commentary and the empirical research to date regarding
asserted barriers to attorneys' discussion and use of ADR. Section InI
describes the survey procedure used in the present study. Section IV presents
the findings regarding how often attorneys voluntarily discussed ADR, when
those discussions first took place, and how often attorneys voluntarily used
ADR processes. Section V describes the prevalence of several ADR-specific
factors thought to act as "barriers" and their influence on how frequently
attorneys discussed and used ADR. Section VI summarizes the findings and
explores their implications for the likely effectiveness of various proposals to
increase voluntary ADR use.
II. A REVIEW OF POTENTIAL BARRIERS TO ATTORNEYS' DISCUSSION
AND USE OF ADR
A. Attorneys' Knowledge of ADR Processes
Commentators maintain that attorneys should be informed about ADR in
order to be able to counsel clients about litigation and ADR options and to
Mediation, 2002 J. DisP. REsOL. 241, 244 (2002). These findings were based on 2000-
2001 interviews with 40 litigators in Toronto and Ottawa, conducted after Rule 24.1
required mediation within 90 days of filing a statement of defense. Id. at 251-52. See also
Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 41 (1982).
12 See infra Part H.
13 Several surveys have been conducted in jurisdictions where attorneys were
required by court rule or ethical code to discuss ADR with clients or opposing counsel.
See generally McAdoo, supra note 4; McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5; Powell, supra
note 5.
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participate effectively in a range of dispute resolution processes. 14 Attorneys
who do not feel sufficiently familiar with ADR processes to discuss them
with clients and opposing counsel and to participate in them might be
reluctant to discuss or use ADR. 15
Several surveys, conducted primarily in the mid-1990s, found that a
sizeable proportion of attorneys were not familiar with the full range of ADR
processes. In general, half or more of the attorneys were familiar with the
processes of arbitration and mediation. 16 Fewer attorneys, however, were
familiar with other ADR processes such as mini-trial, early neutral
evaluation, and summary jury trial. 17 This reported level of familiarity is
consistent with findings that typically half or fewer attorneys had taken a law
school or continuing education ADR course, 18 served as a third-party ADR
neutral, 19 or made frequent use of ADR processes.20
14 A.B.A. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, STATEMENT
OF FUNDAMENTAL LAWYERING SKILLS & PROFESSIONAL VALUES 2, § 8 (1992) (listing
these among the "fundamental lawyering skills" that every attorney should have);
Marshall J. Breger, Should an Attorney Be Required to Advise a Client of ADR Options?,
13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 450 (2000); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and
Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 153, 167 (1999).
In jurisdictions where attorneys are required to advise clients about ADR or where parties
are required to "consider" ADR, attorneys are implicitly, and sometimes explicitly,
required to be informed about ADR. See, e.g., Suzanne J. Schmitz, Giving Meaning to the
Second Generation of ADR Education: Attorneys' Duty to Learn about ADR and What
They Must Learn, 1999 J. DisP. RESOL. 29, 31-35; Plapinger & Stienstra, supra note 3 at
8; COLE ET AL., supra note 3, § 4:3.
15 Wayne D. Brazil, For Judges: Suggestions About What to Say About ADR at Case
Management Conferences--and How to Respond to Concerns or Objections Raised by
Counsel, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 165, 171-83 (2001) [hereinafter ADR
Conference] (explaining that some of the attorneys' possible objections to using ADR
suggest misperceptions of ADR and lack of familiarity with the different processes);
Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found a Better Way?, 18
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 93, 132-33 (2002) [hereinafter Court ADR]; Edward A.
Dauer, Impediments to ADR, 18 COLO. LAW. 839, 841, 849 (1989). These findings were
based on three focus groups concerning impediments to the greater use of ADR,
conducted with lawyers in private firms. Id. at 839-41. See also Wissler et al., supra note
11, at 306; Riskin, supra note 11, at 41, 49; KAKALIK ET AL. , supra note 7, at 52; Folberg
et al., supra note 1, at 383; Rosenberg & Folberg, supra note 7, at 1541; Nancy Welsh &
Barbara McAdoo, The ABCs of ADR: Making ADR Work in Your Court System, JUDGES'
J., Winter 1998, at 11, 13.
16 Cavenagh, supra note 6, at 356; Reuben, supra note 5, at 60; Stipanowich, supra
note 5, at 91 tbl.B, 136 tbl.BB-1; Zariski, supra note 6, app. A at 2.
17 Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 91 tbl.B, 136 tbl.BB-1; Zariski, supra note 6, app. A
at 2.
18 Lande, supra note 5, at 170 tbl.1; Medley & Schellenberg, supra note 5, at 189;
Cavenagh, supra note 6, at 356; McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 485; Wissler,
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Empirical support for the putative link between attorneys' ADR
knowledge and whether they discuss ADR with clients or use ADR varies
depending on how that knowledge was acquired. Attorneys' general
familiarity with or training in dispute resolution had little or no relationship
with whether attorneys recommended ADR to clients21 or whether they used
ADR. 22 Attorneys' direct experience with ADR as a third-party neutral or as
counsel in a prior case, however, was related to whether attorneys
recommended and used ADR. 23
B. Attorneys' Views of ADR
Attorneys' views of ADR, negotiation, and litigation are thought to play
a role in their willingness to discuss and use ADR. Attorneys who view ADR
as offering few advantages, while creating disadvantages relative to
negotiation and trial, might be hesitant to consider ADR. 24
supra note 5, at 220; Zariski, supra note 6, app. A at 10. But cf. Stipanowich, supra note
5, at 137 tbl.CC (reporting that about 60% of construction attorneys had mediation or
arbitration training, and 21% had training in other processes).
19 Lande, supra note 5, at 169; McAdoo, supra note 4, at 464 q.9; McAdoo &
Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 575 q.11; Medley & Schellenberg, supra note 5, at 188-89;
Powell, supra note 5, at 7; Zariski, supra note 6, app. A at 5-6. But cf. Wissler, supra
note 5, at 220 (reporting that 71% of Ohio attorneys had served as a neutral).
20 See supra note 6.
21 Wissler, supra note 5, at 224 (finding that ADR CLEs had little relationship, and
law school dispute resolution courses had no relationship, with whether attorneys
recommended ADR to clients.). However, ADR education played a larger role for
attorneys with no prior ADR experience. Id. at 228-29.
22 See Cavenagh, supra note 6, at 361; Rogers & McEwen, supra note 4, at 842;
Wissler, supra note 5, at 234-35 (finding that taking law school courses was not related
to ADR use and that taking an ADR CLE was not related to overall ADR use, but was
related to the increased use of some processes). Few attorneys felt that lack of
information about ADR processes was an important reason they had not used ADR. See
Cavenagh, supra note 6, at 356-57; McAdoo, supra note 4, at 466 q.12; McAdoo &
Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 489 tbl.7. But see McAdoo, supra note 4, at 447 n.144 (noting
that some attorneys commented that ADR processes such as early neutral evaluation and
summary jury trial were seldom used because attorneys lacked sufficient information
about them).
23 Rogers & McEwen, supra note 4, at 842, 845; Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 108-
09; Wissler, supra note 5, at 235; Wissler et al., supra note 11, at 306.
24 Of course, clients' views of ADR and their policies regarding the handling of
disputes also will affect attorneys' consideration and use of ADR. See, e.g., Craig A.
McEwen, Managing Corporate Disputing: Overcoming Barriers to the Effective Use of
Mediation for Reducing the Cost and Time of Litigation, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL.
1, 9-14 (1998); Macfarlane, supra note 11, at 318; Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross,
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Attorneys' concerns about ADR could reflect misperceptions as a result
of unfamiliarity with ADR.25 In addition, attorneys might not see the
appropriateness or value of ADR because their training, "philosophical map,"
and practice emphasize an adversarial rather than a problem-solving
perspective. 26 And for some attorneys, negative perceptions of ADR could be
the direct result of experience with a poor quality ADR session. 27
Several cognitive barriers that hinder negotiation and settlement 28 also
might affect attorneys' views and impede their use of ADR. For instance, if
"optimistic overconfidence" leads to overestimates of the likelihood of
favorable case outcomes,29 attorneys will be less likely to see a need to use
ADR to facilitate settlement. If their consideration of ADR is "framed" in
terms of what will be lost relative to litigation rather than what will be
gained,30 attorneys will be less likely to use ADR. And if their opponent
proposes ADR, "reactive devaluation" 31 will lead attorneys to suspect that
using ADR will be to their disadvantage and to view it less positively.
Introduction to BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 2, 6, 19-20 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al.
eds., 1995); Wissler et al., supra note 11, at 301-04.
25 See supra note 15.
26 Riskin, supra note 11, at 44-45; William F. Coyne, Jr., Using Settlement Counsel
for Early Dispute Resolution, 15 NEGOT. J. 11 (1999) (arguing that a problem-solving
mind-set is incompatible with the mind-set of an effective trial advocate); Heumann &
Hyman, supra note 11, at 295 (suggesting that attorneys' habitual practices in litigation
explained why positional negotiations took place in a majority of cases, even though
attorneys would prefer problem-solving negotiations); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Transformation of Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dispute Paradigm Does and Does Not
Tell Us, 1985 Mo. J. DisP. RESOL. 25, 30-34 (1985); HERBERT KRITZER, LAWYERS WHO
LITIGATE: BACKGROUND, WORK SETTING, AND ATTITUDES 21 (Disputes Processing
Research Program, Working Papers Series 9:5, 1988) (reporting that civil litigators were
substantially more likely to rate "arguing and trying cases" rather than "negotiating" as
the aspect of their work they liked best); Macfarlane, supra note 11, at 282, 302.
27 See, e.g., Wissler et al., supra note 11, at 306.
28 See generally, Mnookin & Ross, supra note 24, at 6-19; Jean R. Sternlight,
Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to
Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 269,
307-14 (1999) (summarizing the psychological research on barriers to settlement); Lee
Ross & Constance Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOT. J. 389, 392-96
(1991).
29 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive
Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 44, 45-48 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al.
eds., 1995).
30 Id. at 54.
31 Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 27, 28, 38 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
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In addition, attorneys' economic interests could color their views of the
relative benefits of ADR and litigation. Attorneys who are paid on a
contingent-fee basis might give insufficient weight to the importance of their
client's non-monetary goals 32 and, thus, attach less importance to ADR's
potential for addressing those interests. And because contingent-fee lawyers
have an interest in resolving modest cases quickly, 33 they might view ADR
as producing a more expensive and slower resolution than a negotiated
settlement. By contrast, attorneys paid on an hourly fee basis might attach
extra weight to full, formal discovery34 and to the benefits their clients can
derive by delaying settlement or threatening to go to trial. And attorneys'
estimates of whether their long-term compensation, advancement, and
prestige would benefit more from clients' increased use of ADR or of
litigation 35 also could affect their views of these options. 36
The structural and strategic aspects of litigation that are thought to
impede early settlement are also likely to affect attorneys' views of when or
whether to discuss ADR. The demands of numerous other active cases and
the lack of early court deadlines contribute to not assessing cases early for
their ADR or settlement potential. 37 The virtually automatic progression of
litigation and the inertia of following the usual process, 38 combined with the
32 Stemlight, supra note 28, at 321-22; HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL:
UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION 45-46, 155
(1991) (reporting that contingent-fee lawyers were more likely to avoid non-monetary
cases and were more likely to report money-only exchanges in negotiation than were
lawyers paid hourly); Wissler et al., supra note 11, at 296.
33 See Kritzer, supra note 32, at 32, 44, 105, 125-26, 132 (reporting that most
"ordinary" cases settled with one or two offer-demand exchanges and limited attorney
time devoted to negotiation); HYMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 82 (reporting that
negotiations involved only limited steps and exchange of information).
34 Macfarlane, supra note 11, at 291-92 (reporting that attorneys noted tensions
between discovery and early settlement due to a loss of income); Mnookin & Ross, supra
note 24, at 20-21; Rogers & McEwen, supra note 4, at 842, 863; Folberg et al., supra
note 1, at 358-59.
35 John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers' and
Executives' Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 24 (1998). These findings were based
primarily on a 1994 survey in four states of 70 outside counsel in commercial practice, 58
inside counsel, and 50 executives. Id. at 10-11. See also Macfarlane, supra note 11, at
283; Lande, supra note 5, at 180; Reuben, supra note 5, at 59.
36 Court ADR, supra note 15, at 133; Folberg et al., supra note 1, at 358-59; Riskin,
supra note 11, at 43, 48-49; Rogers & McEwen, supra note 4, at 846.
37 Macfarlane, supra note 11, at 279, 309; McEwen et al., supra note 7, at 172-74;
Coyne, Jr., supra note 26 at 13-14; Folberg et al., supra note 1, at 359.
38 HYMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 81, 118, 138, 162-64; McEwen et al., supra note
7, at 155; McEwen, supra note 24, at 24-26; Lande, supra note 35, at 36; Macfarlane,
467
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escalation of commitment and strategic moves in negotiation, 39 make it
difficult to stop the process and propose ADR.40
One specific view of ADR that is frequently mentioned as a barrier is the
concern that proposing ADR is viewed as a sign of weakness. Attorneys
might be reluctant to discuss ADR if they think it will be interpreted by
clients as a lack of commitment to their case or by opposing counsel as a lack
of confidence or resolve.41 In addition to strategic considerations in the
instant case, some attorneys might have a more general interest in
establishing a reputation for being a fierce litigator and, thus, might not
propose ADR if they think doing so will make them look weak.42
Across a number of surveys, more attorneys had favorable than
unfavorable general attitudes toward ADR processes, although a sizeable
number held intermediate or noncommittal views. 43 And when they assessed
supra note 11, at 279, 309; Heumann & Hyman, supra note 11, at 295.
39 For a discussion of strategic barriers to settlement, which lead each side to take
more extreme or contentious actions in an effort to maximize their outcomes and
minimize the chance of being exploited, see, for example, Mnookin & Ross, supra note
24, at 6-19; Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of
Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REV. 1, 3-16 (1992); McEwen et al., supra
note 7, at 157-59; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Cooperation and Competition
in Litigation: Can Lawyers Dampen Conflict?, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION
184, 187 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
40 Goodpaster, supra note 11, at 224; Lande, supra note 35, at 36; Mnookin & Ross,
supra note 24, at 18-19; Craig A. McEwen & Thomas W. Milburn, Explaining a
Paradox of Mediation, 9 NEGOT. J. 23, 25-28 (1993); Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A.
Neale, Negotiator Reality and Negotiator Cognition: The Interactive Roles of
Prescriptive and Descriptive Research, in NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS 109, 115 (H. Peyton
Young ed., 1991).
41 Dauer, supra note 15, at 840-41; Marguerite Millhauser, The Unspoken
Resistance to Alternative Dispute Resolution, 3 NEGOT. J. 29, 31-32 (1987); KAKALIK ET
AL., supra note 7, at 52; Sternlight, supra note 28, at 320-21; Barbara Mahan, Why
Corporations Hesitate to Mediate, CAL. LAW. Feb. 1989, at 42, 44; Folberg et al., supra
note 1, at 358.
42 Sternlight, supra note 28, at 321-22; Dauer, supra note 15, at 840; Breger, supra
note 14, at 449-50.
43 See, e.g., COLE ET AL., supra note 3, § 4:7 (citing a survey of 900 litigators and
corporate counsel that found a majority thought ADR should be used more frequently);
Lande, supra note 5, at 172-73; McAdoo, supra note 4, at 418; McAdoo & Hinshaw,
supra note 5, at 493 tbl.10; Phillips, supra note 5, at 7 tbl.3, 8 tbl.4; Powell, supra note 5,
at 6; Wissler, supra note 5, at 221. But see, Reuben, supra note 5, at 56 (reporting that
although more attorneys preferred mediation over litigation for resolving disputes (51%
vs. 31%), fewer attorneys preferred arbitration over litigation (31% vs. 43%)). See also
Macfarlane, supra note 11, at 254-59 (describing five sets of attorney attitudes toward
mediation and adjudication).
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their general ADR experience or evaluated a specific ADR program in which
they recently had participated, a majority of attorneys in most studies gave
favorable ratings.44 Limited survey data suggest that few attorneys thought
that proposing ADR to an opponent would be interpreted as a sign of
weakness. 45 With regard to attorneys' assessments of litigation, one study
found that a majority were satisfied with the results of litigation, but that
fewer were satisfied with the litigation process, particularly its slowness and
high costs. 46
The empirical evidence regarding the relationship between attorneys'
attitudes about ADR or litigation and their use of ADR is mixed. One study
found that attorneys who had more favorable attitudes toward the use of
mediation in civil cases were more likely to recommend mediation to clients
and to use mediation. 47 Several studies have found that attitudes favorable to
ADR did not necessarily ensure greater ADR use.48 One study found that
attorneys who were concerned that proposing ADR would signal weakness
were unwilling to communicate their interest in using an alternative process
to opposing counsel, even through an intermediary. 49 The evidence regarding
44 See, e.g., Lande, supra note 5, at 176; Phillips, supra note 5, at 5 tbl.1, 6 tbl.2, 7
tbl.3, 8 tbl.4; Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 121; Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected
Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO
ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 641, 663 (2002); Rosenberg & Folberg, supra note 7, at 1487,
1497-15 10; David I. Levine, Early Neutral Evaluation: The Second Phase, 1989 J. DISP.
REsOL. 1, 16-17, 45-46; James J. Alfini, Summary Jury Trials in State and Federal
Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the Perceptions of Participating Lawyers, 4 OHIO ST.
J. ON DisP. RESOL. 213, 230, 233 (1989); Keith 0. Boyum, Afterword: Does Court-
Annexed Arbitration "Work"?, 14 JUST. SYs. J. 244, 245-46 (1991); BARABARA S.
MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS 6, 77-81
(1990).
45 Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 95; see also Rob Davis, Negotiating Personal Injury
Cases: A Survey of the Attitudes and Beliefs of Personal Injury Lawyers, 68 AUSTL. J. L.
734, 735, 747 (1994) (reporting that about 10% of personal injury litigators in
Queensland, Australia thought that making the first settlement offer was seen as a sign of
weakness).
46 Lande, supra note 35, at 16-17, 23, 35-36.
47 Wissler, supra note 5, at 226 n.146.
48 Lande, supra note 5, at 199, 218, 222 ("Respondents described the familiar 'not in
my case' reaction of ostensible mediation believers when presented with opportunities to
mediate their cases."); Rogers & McEwen, supra note 4, at 841-42, 847; Rosenberg &
Folberg, supra note 7, at 1487; Medley & Schellenberg, supra note 5, at 194-95.
49 Roselle L. Wissler et al., Resolving Libel Cases Out of Court: How Attorneys
View the Libel Dispute Resolution Program, 75 JUDICATURE 329, 332 (1992). These
findings were based on telephone interviews conducted from 1987 to 1990 with 222
attorneys who had considered an alternative process for resolving media libel disputes.
Id. at 330.
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whether there is a relationship between attorneys' perceptions of negotiation
or litigation and their ADR use also is mixed.50
C. Judicial Involvement
Given the many impediments to ADR use discussed above, judicial
involvement in the consideration of ADR processes might be needed to
overcome them.51 Judges' support for the use of ADR can enhance attorneys'
views of the value and appropriateness of ADR. 52 Of course, some of the
same factors that are thought to keep attorneys from discussing ADR might
also act as barriers to greater judicial encouragement of ADR. For instance,
judges might be reluctant to suggest ADR if they themselves are not
knowledgeable about or supportive of ADR. 53 In addition, judges are likely
to be hesitant to discuss ADR with litigants due to concerns about interfering
with the attorney-client relationship. 54 And unless the discussion of ADR
options is integrated into an existing case management system, caseload and
scheduling pressures are likely to prevent judicial involvement.
One study found that judges were not very familiar with ADR processes
and that they had more favorable attitudes toward those processes with which
they were more familiar.55 In another study, a majority of judges had
generally favorable attitudes toward mediation, including toward mandating
its use when neither party requested it.56 These studies, however, did not
50 See Lande, supra note 35, at 42 tbl.3 (reporting that for outside counsel, those
who thought the court system was working well used ADR in fewer cases, but for inside
counsel there was no relationship between views of litigation and ADR use); McAdoo,
supra note 4, at 466 q.12 (reporting that 40% of attorneys who had not used ADR said it
was because they settle their cases without the use of ADR); McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra
note 5, at 576 q.14 (reporting that 30% of attorneys who had not used ADR said it was
because they preferred a trial).
51 See generally ADR Conference, supra note 15 (discussing how judges can
respond to attorneys' various concerns about ADR); KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 7, at 52;
Welsh & McAdoo, supra note 15, at 13.
52 Lande, supra note 5, at 221; Macfarlane, supra note 11, at 315.
53 Court ADR, supra note 15, at 124-32 (discussing some reasons judges may be
ambivalent about or hostile to ADR); Folberg et al., supra note 1, at 364-65, 415-16
(listing judges' ratings of their familiarity with and concerns about ADR processes). An
uninformed or nonsupportive judge could not hold the kind of ADR discussions
presented in ADR Conference, supra note 15.
54 Folberg et al., supra note 1, at 371.
55 Id. at 364-65, 415.
56 Morris L. Medley & James A. Schellenberg, Attitudes of Indiana Judges Toward
Mediation, 11 MEDIATION Q. 329, 332-33 (1994). These findings were based on a 1992
survey of 187 Indiana state trial court judges. Id. at 330-33.
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examine whether judges' familiarity with or attitudes toward ADR were
related to their encouragement of ADR use. And with regard to the impact of
judicial involvement, the combined findings of two studies suggested that
knowing that judges would encourage or order the use of ADR stimulated
attorneys to consider and voluntarily use ADR, whereas knowing the court
would not encourage or order ADR had the opposite effect.57
Im. THE PRESENT STUDY: SURVEY PROCEDURE AND RESPONDENT
CHARACTERISTICS
Questionnaires 58 were mailed to all members of the Trial Practice
Section 59 of the State Bar of Arizona in June 2001. At that time, Arizona
attorneys had no explicit obligation to consider ADR.60 The questionnaire
57 McAdoo, supra note 4, at 466 q.12, 470 q.28, 472 q.37, 476 q.48 (reporting that
Minnesota judges took some action in a majority of cases in which attorneys did not
agree on ADR, and only 16% of attorneys who had not used ADR gave as their reason
that the court did not actively encourage or order ADR; 44% of the attorneys who
voluntarily used mediation, 42% of those who used non-binding arbitration, and 15% of
those who used binding arbitration said they did so because they anticipated the court
would order ADR). Cf. McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 11, at 489 tbl.7, 501 tbl.19, 513
tbl.25, 533 tbl.34 (reporting that Missouri judges took some action in a minority of cases
in which attorneys did not agree on ADR, and 34% of attorneys who had not used ADR
gave as their reason that the court did not actively encourage or order ADR; only 7% of
the attorneys who voluntarily used mediation (and none who used non-binding
arbitration) said they did so because they anticipated the court would order ADR).
58 The questionnaire was accompanied by a cover letter signed by the Chief Justice
of the Arizona Supreme Court. Names and mailing addresses of the attorneys were
obtained from the State Bar of Arizona. Bob Dauber and Ann Woodley also were
involved in planning the study and designing the questionnaire. Patrick Scott and the
Administrative Office of the Courts distributed the questionnaires and Susan Minchuk
processed the completed questionnaires.
59 We selected the Trial Practice Section because we assumed this group of attorneys
would devote a substantial portion of their practice to civil litigation and, thus, would be
the group for whom questions about the use of ADR in civil cases would be most
relevant. See Wissler, supra note 5, at 220 n.118 (reporting that Ohio attorneys in civil
litigation practice were more likely than those in non-litigation or criminal law practice to
say that mediation was relevant to their practice and to say they had used ADR).
60 The survey was conducted to collect information on attorneys' practices and
attitudes prior to the adoption of an amendment to Rule 16(g) of the Arizona Rules of
Civil Procedure. The questionnaires, which did not mention the proposed amendment,
were completed after the petition to amend the rule had been filed and during the
comment period for the proposed amendment. The amendment, which was subsequently
adopted and took effect in December 2001, requires parties to confer about the possibility
of settlement or ADR use within three months after the defendant's appearance (i.e.,
filing of an answer or responsive motion) and to report the outcome of that discussion to
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asked the attorneys about their discussions and use of ADR in the context of
their Arizona state court civil practice during the preceding two years. The
attorneys also were asked about their knowledge of different ADR processes,
potential benefits of and barriers to using ADR, and the nature of their law
practice.
Four hundred forty-six completed questionnaires were received, for a
response rate of 45%.61 Eighty-two percent of the respondents (363
attorneys) practiced primarily in Maricopa County (which includes the
Phoenix metropolitan area), 15% (67 attorneys) practiced primarily in Pima
County (which includes the Tucson metropolitan area), and 3% (15
attorneys) practiced primarily in the 13 other counties. 62
Consistent with expectations, most attorneys (82%) devoted most of their
practice (90% or more) to civil litigation.63 Because we assumed that
attorneys whose practice involved a greater proportion of civil litigation
would provide more informed judgments, we limited the analyses reported in
this Article to those attorneys who devoted half or more of their practice to
civil litigation. This excluded 17 (4%) of the respondents. Thus, the findings
reported in this article are based on the 426 Trial Practice Section members
who devoted at least half of their practice to civil litigation. On average,
these attorneys devoted 94% of their practice to civil litigation. 64
Fifty-four percent of attorneys said the majority of their civil litigation
practice was in the tort or personal injury area,65 42% practiced in the
the court. ARIz. R. Civ. P. 16(g)(2).
61 Four questionnaires were returned as undeliverable. Two attorneys returned the
questionnaire without completing it, indicating that their practice did not currently
involve civil litigation. We did not have information that would permit us to assess
whether attorneys who responded were representative of all attorneys in the sample, or
whether they differed in some way from those who did not respond.
62 One attorney did not specify a county. The response rate for the non-urban
counties was lower than for the two urban counties. We did not have information that
would permit us to ascertain whether this pattern for the non-urban counties reflected a
true lower rate of returning questionnaires in those counties, or whether it was due to the
fact that some attorneys practiced primarily in an urban county, even though their mailing
address was in a non-urban county.
63 The attorneys devoted from 1% to 100% of their practice to civil litigation, with
an average of 90%. Throughout the article, when we report the "average" response, we
are reporting the mean (i.e., the sum of the values of the responses divided by the number
of responses). RICHARD P. RUNYON & AUDREY HABER, FUNDAMENTALS OF BEHAVIORAL
STATISTICS 90 (5th ed. 1984).
64 Sixty-three percent of attorneys spent all of their practice in civil litigation, 29%
spent three-fourths to 90% of their practice in civil litigation, and 8% spent half to three-
fourths of their practice in civil litigation.
65 Forty-seven percent of personal injury attorneys primarily represented plaintiffs
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business or commercial area, 2% practiced in the family law area, and 2%
practiced in other areas. 66 The attorneys had been practicing law, on average,
for seventeen years, with a range of one to fifty years. Twelve percent of the
attorneys were solo practitioners, 32% worked in small firms, 23% in
medium-sized firms, and 28% worked in large firms.67 Only 3% of the
attorneys were corporate or in-house counsel, and 2% worked in a
governmental, public, or tribal agency.
IV. ATTORNEYS' VOLUNTARY DISCUSSION AND USE OF ADR
In this section, we report how often attorneys voluntarily discussed ADR
in their state court civil practice during the two years preceding the survey.
We explore in what proportion of their cases attorneys discussed ADR with
clients and with opposing counsel and when those discussions first took
place. In addition, we examine how frequently attorneys voluntarily used
ADR and which processes they tended to use.68
and 53% primarily represented defendants. Throughout the Article, we report when
personal injury plaintiffs and defense attorneys differed significantly in their actions or
views. Similarly, we report when attorneys practicing in the personal injury area differed
significantly from those practicing in the business area.
66 
"Other" practice areas listed by the attorneys included environmental law, probate
and trust litigation, administrative law, condemnation or eminent domain, and
government employment and civil rights.
67 The size of the firm in which attorneys worked varied significantly depending on
whether they practiced primarily in the business area or in the personal injury area, and
for the latter group, depending on whether they primarily represented plaintiffs or
defendants (Q2 (6, N = 387) = 89.33, p < .001). Attorneys who represented plaintiffs in
personal injury cases were more likely than personal injury defense attorneys and
attorneys who primarily handled business cases to be in solo (30% vs. 3% and 7%,
respectively) or small firm practice (51% vs. 29% and 27%), and were less likely to be in
medium (15% vs. 30% and 26%) or large firm practice (4% vs. 38% and 40%).
To determine whether apparent differences are "true" differences (i.e., statistically
significant differences) or merely reflect chance variation, tests of statistical significance
must be conducted. Throughout the Article, we use one of the following statistical tests,
depending on the question at issue: chi-square ( 2), t-test (t), or analysis of variance (F).
See RUNYON & HABER, supra note 63, at 278, 297-98, 363-64. The conventional level of
probability for determining the statistical significance of findings for all of these tests is
the .05 level (i.e., p < .05). Id. at 229-3 1.
68 The questionnaire included judicial settlement conferences among the examples
of voluntary ADR processes and specifically excluded unfacilitated settlement
negotiations. See infra note 89 for a description of settlement conference programs.
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A. Frequency and Timing of ADR Discussions
Attorneys discussed the possible use of a voluntary ADR process with
their clients, on average, in 78% of their filed civil cases. Forty percent of
attorneys discussed ADR with clients in all of their cases, and 35% of
attorneys did so in 75% to 99% of their cases.69 Only 13% of attorneys
discussed ADR with clients in fewer than half of their cases.70
Table 1. Discussion of Possible ADR Use
This percentage of This percentage of
In this percentage of their attorneys attorneys discussed
cases: discussed ADR ADR with
with clients opposing counsel
none of their cases 3% 5%
less than 1/4 of cases 6% 12%
1/4 to less than half of cases 4% 11%
half to less than 3/4 of cases 12% 25%
3/4 to 99% of cases 35% 34%
all of their cases 40% 13%
Attorneys discussed the possible use of a voluntary ADR process with
opposing counsel, 71 on average, in 60% of their filed civil cases. Almost half
of the attorneys (47%) discussed ADR with opposing counsel in three-
fourths or more of their cases, and 25% did so in half to three-fourths of their
cases.
72
6 9 See Table 1.
70 For the frequency of client consultation in jurisdictions where it is required, see
infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
71 Comments written on the questionnaires indicated that a few attorneys considered
claims representatives or insurance adjusters as "opposing counsel" when answering this
question.
72 See Table 1. The proportion of attorneys who seldom voluntarily discussed ADR
with opposing counsel in the present study is comparable to that observed in another
survey. See McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 500 tbl.17 (finding that 15% of
attorneys "hardly ever" discussed ADR options with opposing counsel). Based on the
comments a few attorneys had written on the questionnaire in the present study, some
attorneys who never discussed voluntary ADR with opposing counsel primarily handled
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Thus, attorneys discussed ADR in a larger proportion of their cases with
clients than with opposing counsel. 73 For instance, attorneys who discussed
ADR with clients in all of their cases discussed ADR with opposing counsel,
on average, in 77% of their cases. Nonetheless, there was a strong
relationship between discussing ADR with clients and with opposing
counsel, such that attorneys who discussed ADR with clients in more cases
also discussed ADR with opposing counsel in more cases.74 These observed
patterns would be consistent with what would be expected if attorneys
typically discuss ADR with opposing counsel only after conferring with their
clients. 75
ADR discussions, however, did not routinely occur early in the litigation
process. One-third of attorneys often, almost always, or always discussed
ADR with opposing counsel before the complaint was filed or within three
months after the defendant's appearance. 76 Fifty percent of attorneys
sometimes discussed ADR with opposing counsel early in the case, while
17% never or hardly ever discussed ADR early. 77
cases subject to mandatory ADR. In Arizona state courts, non-binding arbitration is
required for all filed civil cases in which the amount in controversy does not exceed a
jurisdictional limit established by each county (e.g., $50,000 in Maricopa County). ARiZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-133; ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 72-76; SUPER. CT. OF MARICOPA CO., ARIZ.
R. 3.10.
73 t(416) = 14.28, p < .001. Few attorneys (7%) reported talking about ADR more
often with opposing counsel than with their clients.
74 r(415) = .661, p < .001. The Pearson r statistic assesses whether an apparent
relationship between two variables is a "true" relationship (i.e., is statistically significant)
or merely reflects chance variation. The conventional level of probability for determining
the statistical significance of findings is the .05 level (i.e., p < .05). The value of r (the
correlation coefficient) indicates the strength of the relationship and ranges from +1.00 to
-1.00, with 0.00 representing no relationship between the variables. RUNYON & HABER,
supra note 63, at 140-42, 229-31. As a rough guide to interpreting the size of correlation
coefficients, r = .10 is considered a small relationship, r = .30 is considered medium, and
r = .50 is considered a large relationship. ROBERT ROSENTHAL & RALPH L. ROSNOW,
ESSENTIALS OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 361 (1984).
75 See also McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 497 tbl.14, 500 tbl.17 (showing
that in the first three months after the case was filed, attorneys were almost twice as
likely to discuss ADR with clients as with opposing counsel).
76 We defined this time period as "early" to correspond with the amendment to Rule
16(g)(2), which now requires the parties to confer about settlement and ADR use within
the first 90 days after the defendant's appearance. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 16(g)(2). This time
period generally corresponds to four to nine months after the complaint was filed,
depending on how quickly the plaintiff serves the defendant and how quickly the
defendant responds. ARIz. R.Civ. P. 4(i), 12(a)(1).
77 See Table 2. Attorneys who practiced primarily in the business area were more
likely than personal injury attorneys to discuss ADR with opposing counsel early in the
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Attorneys who were more likely to discuss ADR with opposing counsel
early also tended to discuss ADR with clients and with opposing counsel in
more of their cases. 78 For instance, attorneys who often, almost always, or
always discussed ADR early talked about ADR with opposing counsel, on
average, in 72% of their cases. In contrast, attorneys who never or hardly
ever discussed ADR early talked about ADR with opposing counsel, on
average, in 51% of their cases.
Attorneys were more likely to discuss settlement early in their cases than
to discuss ADR early.79 Over half (53%) of the attorneys often, almost
always, or always discussed settlement early. 80 Of those attorneys who
regularly discussed settlement early in their cases, fewer than half (44%)
regularly discussed ADR during the same time period. Nonetheless, attorneys
who were more likely to discuss settlement with opposing counsel early in
their cases also were more likely to discuss the possible use of ADR early.81
case (t(376) = 3.15, p < .01), although they did not discuss ADR more frequently. Thirty-
nine percent of business attorneys, compared to 28% of personal injury attorneys, said
they often, almost always, or always discussed ADR early. The difference in the timing
of discussions would be consistent with assumptions that business and personal injury
cases differ in ways that might permit earlier discussions in business cases (e.g., that
business cases are more likely to involve disputes in which more information is known
early and in which the parties have an existing or on-going relationship). See also
Macfarlane, supra note 11, at 281 (reporting that business attorneys felt mediation could
be useful early, while personal injury attorneys wanted to wait until they had a more
stable assessment of damages).
78 Opposing counsel: r(393) = .2 36,p <.001. Clients: r(391) = .209,p <.001.
79 t(391) = 9.35, p < .001.
80 See Table 2. As for ADR discussions, attorneys who practiced primarily in the
business area were more likely to discuss settlement early than were personal injury
attorneys (F(1,401) = 19.06, p < .001). Sixty-six percent of business attorneys, compared
to 41% of personal injury attorneys, said they often, almost always, or always discussed
settlement early. See supra note 77.
81 r(390) = .292, p < .001.
Table 2. Frequency of Attorneys' Early Discussion of:
ADR Settlement
never or hardly ever 17% 5%
sometimes 50% 42%
often 26% 35%
always or almost always 7% 18%
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These observed patterns would be consistent with what would be expected if
attorneys typically discuss ADR use only after they first try unfacilitated
settlement negotiations.
B. Frequency of ADR Use
Almost all attorneys (95%) had used a voluntary ADR process in at least
one case in the prior two years. 82 This does not mean, however, that most
attorneys used ADR in most of their cases; on average, they used a voluntary
ADR process in 41% of their cases. 83 Twenty percent of attorneys used ADR
in three-fourths or more of their cases, and 25% used ADR in half to three-
fourths of their cases. 84 One-third of attorneys used ADR in fewer than one-
fourth of their cases.
82 Almost all attorneys had used mediation (96%) and a majority had used judge pro
tern settlement conferences (71%) (see infra note 89) or private arbitration (5 8%), but few
had used shortriallsummary jury trial (SJT) (18%) (see infra note 91) or early neutral
evaluation (ENE) (12%). Personal injury attorneys used mediation (t(380) = 3.43, p <
.01) and shortrial/SJT (t(356) = 2.69, p < .01) more frequently than did business
attorneys.
Other surveys also typically have found that a majority of attorneys have used ADR.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Surveys of civil litigators or general attorney
populations also have found a similar pattern of use among the ADR processes: a
majority of attorneys have used mediation, an intermediate number have used arbitration,
and relatively few have used ENE, SJT, or mini-trial. See McAdoo, supra note 4, at 468-
69 q. 20; McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 578 q.18; Powell, supra note 5, at 6;
Wissler, supra note 5, at 220-21; Zariski, supra note 6, app. A at 5. But surveys of
attorneys who practiced in the construction and entertainment areas found greater use of
binding arbitration than mediation. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 7 tbl.3, 8 tbl.4;
Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 90 tbls.A-1, A-2, 132 tbl.AA-1.
83 Attorneys who practiced primarily in the personal injury area used voluntary
ADR in a larger proportion of their cases (46%) than did attorneys who practiced
primarily in the business area (36%) (t(401) = -3.55, p < .001). This finding does not
seem to be explained by the relative frequency or timing of ADR discussions by business
versus personal injury attorneys.
84 See Table 3. See supra note 6 for other studies that reported the frequency of
ADR use (voluntary and compulsory use combined).
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C. Relationships Between the Discussion and Use of ADR
We examined the relationship between the frequency and timing of
attorneys' ADR discussions and the frequency of voluntary ADR use.
Because attorneys would need to discuss voluntary ADR processes in order
to use them, it is not surprising that attorneys who more frequently discussed
ADR with clients and with opposing counsel also tended to use ADR more
often.85 Interestingly, attorneys who were more likely to discuss ADR early
in their cases did not use ADR more frequently. 86
The frequency of ADR discussions with clients and with opposing
counsel, taken together, accounted for 50% of the variation in the frequency
of voluntary ADR use.87 That is, half of the differences among attorneys in
how often they used voluntary ADR processes could be explained by how
85 Clients: r(415) = .496, p < .001. Counsel: r(420) = .709, p < .001. However,
attorneys used ADR in a smaller proportion of their cases than those in which they
discussed ADR with clients (t(421) = 16.98, p < .001) or with opposing counsel (t(416) =
25.94, p < .001). For instance, attorneys who discussed ADR with clients in all of their
cases used ADR, on average, in 55% of their cases.
86 Although more frequent early ADR discussions were not associated with more
frequent ADR use (r(393) = .080, p = .114), they were associated with earlier settlements
(r(392) = .135, p < .01). More frequent early settlement discussions also were associated
with earlier settlements (r(418) =. 171, p < .001), but were associated with less frequent
ADR use (r(415) = -.119, p < .05).
87 F(2,414) = 204.99, p < .001; R = .707, R2 = .50. R indicates the strength of the
relationship between a set of measures being used as predictors (e.g., discussing ADR
with clients and with opposing counsel) and the measure being predicted (e.g., ADR use).
See BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS 53
(1983). R2 indicates the proportion of variation in the measure being predicted (here,
ADR use) that is explained or accounted for by the set of predictors. Id. at 97.
Table 3. Voluntary ADR Use
In this percentage This percentage of
of their cases: attorneys used ADR
none of their cases 5%
less than 1/4 of cases 28%
1/4 to less than half of cases 22%
half to less than 3/4 of cases 25%
3/4 to all of their cases 20%
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often they discussed ADR options. Accordingly, factors that act as barriers to
attorneys' discussions of ADR could potentially also play a sizeable role in
how often attorneys use ADR.
V. POTENTIAL BARRIERS: THEIR PREVALENCE AND IMPACT ON
VOLUNTARY ADR DISCUSSIONS AND USE
In this section, we examine a set of ADR-specific factors that are thought
to constrain attorneys' discussion and use of ADR, including attorneys'
knowledge of ADR processes; attorneys' views of ADR and attitudes toward
policies mandating ADR discussion and use; and the extent to which courts
encourage the use of ADR. We explore how widespread these factors are, as
well as whether they are related to attorneys' voluntary discussions about and
use of ADR.
A. Attorneys' Knowledge of ADR Processes
Attorneys were more knowledgeable about some ADR processes than
others. 88 A majority of attorneys said they could explain "very well" the
processes of mediation (83%), binding arbitration (83%), non-binding
arbitration (78%) or judge pro tem settlement conference 89 (75%).90 Fewer
than half of the attorneys, however, said they could explain "very well" the
88 See Table 4. To assess attorneys' ADR knowledge, we asked them to rate how
well they could explain each of several ADR processes to clients. They made their ratings
on a 5-point scale, with "1" labeled "not at all," "3" labeled "somewhat," and "5" labeled
"very well." The percentages reported here for "not at all or a little" are the percentage of
ratings of "1" or "2"; "somewhat" is the percentage of ratings of "3"; "well" is the
percentage of ratings of "4"; and "very well" is the percentage of ratings of "5."
89 The judges pro tempore generally were attorneys serving pro bono. Maricopa
County had a civil settlement conference program within its ADR Programs Office, and
the conferences were conducted primarily by judges pro tern or by court commissioners.
See SUPER. CT. OF MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIz., ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROGRAMS INFORMATION SHEET (2002). In Pima County, judges pro tern conducted 45%
of the settlement conferences held. See SUPER. CT. OF PIMA COUNTY, ARIZ., 2002 REP.,
SETrLEMENT CONFERENCES. Although the questionnaire specified "judge pro tern
settlement conference," we cannot be sure whether attorneys answered based on this
more narrow categorization or whether they also considered judicial settlement
conferences in their answers.
90 Attorneys' familiarity with mediation and binding arbitration did not differ, nor
did their familiarity with judge pro tem settlement conference and non-binding arbitration
differ. However, attorneys felt better able to explain binding arbitration and mediation
than non-binding arbitration and judge pro tem settlement conference (p's < .01).
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processes of shortrial/summary jury trial (SJT)9 1 (40%)92 or early neutral
evaluation (ENE) (35%).93 Attorneys who were more familiar with one ADR
process also tended to be more familiar with each of the other ADR
processes. 94
Table 4. How Well Attorneys Said They Could Explain
ADR Processes to Clients
Binding Non- Settlement Shortrial
Mediation arb. inding arb. conference or SJT ENE
not at all,
a little 1% 1% 3% 3% 14% 18%
somewhat 3% 4% 5% 7% 26% 23%
well 13% 12% 14% 15% 19% 15%
ery well 83% 83% 78% 75% 40% 35%
Attorneys' knowledge of ADR was related to the frequency of their ADR
discussions and use. Specifically, attorneys who were less familiar with ADR
91 In a shortrial, a four-person jury hears an abbreviated presentation of trial
evidence and then renders a binding verdict. See Christopher M. Skelly, Want a
"Shortrial"? Here's How, MARICOPA LAW., March 1999, at 16. A shortrial differs from a
summary jury trial in that the latter involves a six-person jury rendering a non-binding
verdict. See, e.g., Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial-An Alternative Method
of Resolving Disputes, 69 JUDICATURE 286, 288-90 (1986). In at least one county,
however, attorneys and judges often used these terms interchangeably. Accordingly, we
combined the attorneys' responses regarding these two processes for reporting in this
Article.
9 2 Personal injury attorneys were more familiar with shortrial/SJT than were
business attorneys (t(397) = 3.59, p < .001), but they did not differ in their knowledge of
any other process.
93 Attorneys were more familiar with shortrial/SJT than ENE (t(416) = 6.89, p <
.001). Attorneys were more knowledgeable about mediation, binding and non-binding
arbitration, and judge pro tem settlement conference than about either shortrial/SJT or
ENE (p's < .001). These findings of greater familiarity with mediation and arbitration
than with SJT and ENE generally parallel those of other surveys. See supra notes 16-17
and accompanying text.
9 4 The r's ranged from .307 to .664, p's < .001. For use in subsequent analyses, the
measures of how well attorneys could explain each of the ADR processes were combined
into a single measure of how well they could explain ADR processes overall. This
measure had a Cronbach's alpha of .831. Cronbach's alpha indicates the reliability and
internal consistency of a scale, and its values range from a low of 0.00 to a high of 1.00.
EDWARD G. CARMiNES & RICHARD A. ZELLER, RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY ASSESSMENT
44-47 (1979).
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were less likely to discuss ADR with clients95 and with opposing counsel,96
and were less likely to discuss ADR early in the case.97 For instance,
attorneys who felt "somewhat" or less able to explain ADR processes
discussed ADR with clients, on average, in 61% of their cases, whereas
attorneys who felt they could explain ADR processes "very well" discussed
ADR with clients, on average, in 83% of their cases. Similarly, attorneys
who were less familiar with ADR processes 98 used a voluntary ADR process
in fewer cases. 99
B. Attorneys' Views of ADR
We asked the attorneys to indicate their views l°° regarding several
potential benefits of ADR and possible concerns about using ADR, as well as
their attitudes toward policies mandating ADR discussion and use.
95 r(408) = .226, p < .001.
96 r(414) = .224, p < .001. Attorneys who felt "somewhat" or less able to explain
ADR processes discussed ADR with opposing counsel, on average, in 42% of their cases,
whereas attorneys who felt they could explain ADR processes "very well" discussed
ADR with opposing counsel, on average, in 65% of their cases.
97 r(387) = .158, p < .01. Attorneys who felt "somewhat" or less able to explain
ADR processes routinely discussed ADR early, on average, in 23% of their cases,
whereas attorneys who felt they could explain ADR processes "very well" routinely
discussed ADR early, on average, in 37% of their cases.
98 r(413) = .103, p < .05. Attorneys who felt "somewhat" or less able to explain
ADR processes used ADR, on average, in 33% of their cases, whereas attorneys who felt
they could explain ADR processes "very well" used ADR, on average, in 43% of their
cases.
Because our data are based on correlations between measures of ADR knowledge
and ADR use that were obtained at the same point in time, we cannot tell whether this
correlation reflects that attorneys who are less familiar with ADR are less likely to use
ADR, that attorneys who have used ADR less frequently are less familiar with ADR, that
some third factor (e.g., case mix or firm or client policies) underlies both less ADR
knowledge and less ADR use, or that some combination of all three processes is
operating. See RUNYON & HABER, supra note 63, at 180-81 (explaining that correlations
assess whether two variables are associated with one another but not whether one causes
the other or whether both are caused by a third variable).
99 We also examined the relationship between familiarity with and use of each ADR
process. Attorneys who felt less able to explain a particular ADR process tended to use
that process less often (r's ranged from .133 to .254, p's < .01); the only exception was
that familiarity with non-binding arbitration was not significantly related to using private
arbitration. As an example, 27% of the attorneys who could explain mediation only
"somewhat" or less well used mediation often, almost always, or always, whereas 82% of
the attorneys who could explain mediation "very well" used mediation that frequently.
100 We asked the attorneys to answer these questions with regard to ADR processes
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1. Benefits of ADR
More attorneys thought that ADR processes offered benefits than thought
they did not. Forty-one percent of attorneys thought clients were more
satisfied as a result of using ADR, whereas 14% thought they were not. 101
Sixty-one percent of attorneys thought cases settled earlier in ADR, while
only 12% thought they did not.102 Seventy-one percent of attorneys felt the
benefits involved in using ADR outweighed the costs; only 5% felt they did
not. 103 Not surprisingly, attorneys who thought that ADR resulted in earlier
settlement and higher client satisfaction also thought the benefits of using
ADR outweighed the costs. 1° 4 Interestingly, attorneys who were less
knowledgeable about ADR were less likely to think that ADR provided
benefits. 105
other than compulsory arbitration. See supra note 72. The attorneys rated each dimension
on a 5-point scale, with "1" labeled "strongly disagree" and "5" labeled "strongly agree."
The percentages reported here for "disagree" are the percentage of ratings of "1" or "2";
"agree" reflects the percentage of ratings of "4" or "5"; and "neither agree nor disagree"
is the percentage of ratings of "3."
101 See Table 5. It is worth noting that almost half (45%) of the attorneys were
noncommittal or uncertain as to whether ADR produced greater client satisfaction, a
larger proportion than for the other questions about ADR's benefits. Other surveys also
have found that a minority of attorneys thought mediation or arbitration produced greater
client satisfaction than litigation. See McAdoo, supra note 4, at 473 q.42, 477 q.49;
McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 585 q.42, 592 q.52, 593 q.54; Reuben, supra note
5, at 56.
102 See also McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 495 tbl. 12 (35% of attorneys
thought cases usually or always settled faster when ADR was used, and 48% thought they
sometimes did). In several surveys that asked about specific types of ADR processes, a
majority of attorneys thought that cases settled earlier in mediation than in litigation, but
the percentage who thought that arbitration resolved cases faster than litigation varied
across the surveys. See Medley & Schellenberg, supra note 5, at 190; McAdoo, supra
note 4, at 473 q.42, 477 q. 49; McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 585 q.42, 592 q.52,
593 q.54; Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 148.
103 For attorneys' general views of ADR in other surveys, see supra note 43.
104The r's ranged from .399 to .423, p's < .001. For use in subsequent analyses,
these three dimensions were combined into a single measure of attorneys' perceptions of
ADR's benefits, which had a Cronbach's alpha of .674. Personal injury defense attorneys
thought ADR was less likely to produce benefits than did personal injury plaintiffs'
attorneys (t(225) = 3.83, p < .001).
'05 r(410) = .l13, p <.05.
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Table 5. Attorneys' Views of Benefits of ADR
Greater client Cases settle Benefits
satisfaction earlier outweigh costs
agree 41% 61% 71%
neither agree nor disagree 45% 27% 24%
disagree 14% 12% 5%
Attorneys reported that, on average, 69% of their cases that went to ADR
settled as a result of the ADR process. Thirty-seven percent of attorneys
reported that 90% or more of their ADR cases settled as a result of the
process, and almost one-fourth said that 75% to 89% of their ADR cases
settled. Twenty-two percent of attorneys said half to three-fourths of their
ADR cases settled as a result of the process, and 17% said that fewer than
half of their ADR cases settled. Not surprisingly, attorneys who reported a
lower rate of settlement in their cases that used ADR thought that ADR
offered fewer benefits. 106
Attorneys' views of whether ADR offered benefits were related to the
frequency of their ADR discussions and use. Attorneys who thought ADR
provided fewer benefits were less likely to discuss ADR with their clients 10 7
and with opposing counsel 10 8 and were less likely to have those discussions
early in their cases.10 9 Similarly, attorneys whose cases had a lower rate of
settlement in ADR processes were less likely to discuss ADR with their
clients" 0 and with opposing counsel.1 11 The rate of settlement attorneys
106 r(393) = .413, p <.001.
107 r(411) = .234, p < .001. Attorneys who thought that ADR did not provide
benefits discussed ADR with clients, on average, in 65% of their cases, whereas attorneys
who thought ADR offered benefits discussed ADR with clients, on average, in 85% of
their cases.
108 r(416) = .306, p < .001. Attorneys who thought that ADR did not provide
benefits discussed ADR with opposing counsel, on average, in 43% of their cases, while
attorneys who thought ADR offered benefits discussed ADR with opposing counsel, on
average, in 72% of their cases.
109 r(391) = .174, p < .01. Attorneys who thought ADR did not provide benefits
regularly discussed ADR early, on average, in 18% of their cases, whereas attorneys who
thought ADR offered benefits regularly discussed ADR early, on average, in 44% of their
cases.
110 r(394) = .191, p < .001. Attorneys who reported that half or fewer of their ADR
cases settled discussed ADR with clients, on average, in 75% of their cases, whereas
attorneys who reported that 90% or more of their ADR cases settled discussed ADR with
clients, on average, in 84% of their cases.
111 r(396) = .260, p < .001. Attorneys who reported settlement in half or fewer of
their ADR cases discussed ADR with opposing counsel, on average, in 52% of their
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
experienced in their ADR cases, however, was not related to whether they
discussed ADR early. Nonetheless, attorneys who thought that ADR offered
fewer benefits112 and who reported a lower rate of settlement in their ADR
cases 113 were less likely to use voluntary ADR processes.
2. "Sign of Weakness"
Relatively few attorneys felt that clients or other attorneys perceived
suggesting ADR as a sign of weakness (17% and 13%, respectively). 114 In
contrast, over half of the attorneys did not think others viewed proposing
ADR as signaling weakness. 115 Interestingly, attorneys who were less
familiar with ADR were more likely to think that others viewed proposing
ADR as a sign of weakness. 116
Table 6. Proposing ADR Is Seen as a "Sign of Weakness"
by clients By other attorneys
agree 17% 13%
neither agree nor disagree 30% 30%
disagree 53% 57% 1
cases, whereas attorneys who reported settlement in 90% or more of their ADR cases
discussed ADR with opposing counsel, on average, in 69% of their cases.
112 r(415) = .246, p < .001. Attorneys who thought ADR did not provide benefits
used ADR, on average, in 25% of their cases, whereas those who thought ADR offered
benefits used ADR, on average, in 51% of their cases.
113 r(396) = .235, p < .001. Attorneys who reported settlement in half or fewer of
their ADR cases used ADR, on average, in 33% of their cases, while attorneys who
reported settlement in 90% or more of their ADR cases used ADR, on average, in 48% of
their cases.
114 Table 6. See supra note 45 and accompanying text for the findings of other
surveys.
115 Attorneys who thought that other attorneys viewed proposing ADR as a sign of
weakness also tended to think that clients viewed proposing ADR as a sign of weakness
(r(422) = .520, p < .001). These two measures of perceived weakness were combined into
a single measure, which had a Cronbach's alpha of .684, for use in subsequent analyses.
Business attorneys were more likely than personal injury attorneys to think that others
viewed proposing ADR as signaling weakness (t(404) = 3.02, p < .01).
116 r(413) = -.225, p < .001; see also Stipanowich supra note 5, at 108-09 (attorneys
with more mediation experience were less likely to think proposing mediation signaled
weakness).
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Attorneys who were more likely to think others viewed proposing ADR
as a sign of weakness were less likely to discuss ADR with their clients117
and with opposing counsel.11 8 Surprisingly, attorneys' views about whether
proposing ADR signaled weakness were not related to whether they
discussed ADR early in their cases. Nonetheless, attorneys who were more
likely to think proposing ADR was viewed as a sign of weakness were less
likely to use voluntary ADR processes."19
3. Other Concerns About ADR
Attorneys' views regarding other possible concerns about ADR were
mixed. Twenty-six percent of attorneys thought that ADR provided free
discovery for the other side, whereas 42% thought it did not. 120 Thirty-nine
percent of attorneys felt that the supply of qualified ADR neutrals was
insufficient, while 30% thought it was sufficient. 121 Attorneys who were less
knowledgeable about ADR tended to think that ADR provided free
discovery, 122 but ADR knowledge was not related to views about the supply
of neutrals.
117 r(414) = -.174, p < .00 1. Attorneys who thought proposing ADR was seen as a
sign of weakness discussed ADR with clients, on average, in 69% of their cases, whereas
attorneys who thought proposing ADR did not signal weakness discussed ADR with
clients, on average, in 86% of their cases.
118 r(419) = -.179, p < .001. Attorneys who thought proposing ADR was seen as a
sign of weakness discussed ADR with opposing counsel, on average, in 50% of their
cases, while attorneys who thought proposing ADR did not signal weakness discussed
ADR with opposing counsel, on average, in 69% of their cases.
119 r(418) = -.207, p < .001. Attorneys who thought proposing ADR was seen as a
sign of weakness used ADR, on average, in 32% of their cases, whereas attorneys who
thought proposing ADR did not signal weakness used ADR, on average, in 46% of their
cases.
120 See Table 7. Business attorneys were more likely than personal injury attorneys
to think that ADR provided free discovery for the other side (1(403) = 2.60, p < .05).
Other surveys also have found that relatively few attorneys view ADR as providing free
discovery. See McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 576 q.14; Stipanowich, supra note
5, at 121.
121 See Table 7. The findings of other surveys varied greatly with regard to
attorneys' views on the issue of qualified neutrals. See, e.g., Medley & Schellenberg,
supra note 5, at 190 (28% thought there were not enough adequately trained mediators);
Reuben, supra note 5, at 58 (70% were at least "somewhat" concerned about neutrals'
qualifications or personal biases).
122 r(412) = -. 128, p < .0 1.
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Table 7. Attorneys' Concerns about ADR
Provides free Insufficient
discovery qualified neutrals
agree 26% 39%
neither agree nor disagree 32% 31%
disagree 42% 30%
Attorneys' views about whether ADR provided free discovery and
whether the supply of qualified neutrals was sufficient were not related to
how frequently they discussed ADR with clients or with opposing counsel, to
whether they discussed ADR early in their cases, or to how frequently they
used voluntary ADR processes.
4. Attitudes Toward Mandatory ADR Policies
A majority (62%) of attorneys felt that ADR should be used only when
both parties to a dispute wanted to use it. 123 One-fourth, however, supported
mandatory ADR use.
Attorneys were significantly more supportive of requirements to discuss
ADR than requirements to use ADR. 124 Almost half of the attorneys (46%)
felt that the court should require them to attend a pretrial conference to
discuss ADR when they and opposing counsel cannot agree on an ADR
process, while 37% felt they should not be required to attend such a
conference. Attorneys were even more supportive of a requirement to discuss
ADR options early in their cases. 125 Over half of the attorneys (53%) felt that
they should be required to discuss ADR options early, whereas 30% felt that
early ADR discussions should not be required. 126
123 See Table 8. The findings of other surveys varied greatly with regard to
attorneys' views on mandatory ADR use. See, e.g., Medley & Schellenberg, supra note 5,
at 190 (57% thought civil mediation should be used only when both parties wanted to,
while 32% disagreed); Reuben, supra note 5, at 57 (51% felt mandatory ADR programs
should be encouraged, whereas 18% thought they should be discouraged). Similarly,
attorneys' views on ADR contract provisions varied across surveys and with the type of
ADR clause being considered. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 5, at 7 tbl.3, 8 tbl.4;
Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 95 tbl.D, 108 tbl.G, 161-62 tbl.HH-1; Wissler, supra note
5, at 222.
124 Conferences: t(423) = 9.78, p < .001. Discussions: t(422) = 12.65, p < .001.
125 t(423) = 3.49, p < .01.
126 These three measures of attitudes toward mandatory ADR policies were
combined into a scale, which had a Cronbach's alpha of .603, for use in subsequent
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Table 8. Attorneys' Attitudes Toward ADR Policies
Should use ADR Should not Should not be
only when both require ADR required to
sides want to conference discuss ADR
agree 62% 37% 30%
neither agree nor disagree 13% 17% 17%
disagree 25% 46% 53%
Attorneys' support for mandatory ADR policies was related to their
views of ADR's benefits. Attorneys who thought that ADR offered fewer
benefits and who reported a lower rate of settlement in their ADR cases were
less supportive of policies requiring ADR discussions and use.127 However,
attorneys' level of ADR knowledge or their concerns that ADR signaled
weakness, provided free discovery, or had an insufficient pool of qualified
neutrals were not related to their attitudes toward mandatory ADR policies.
Attorneys who were less supportive of mandatory ADR policies were
less likely to discuss ADR with their clients128 and with opposing counsel. 129
Attorneys' overall attitudes toward mandatory ADR policies, however, were
not related to whether they discussed ADR early in their cases. 130 But
analyses. Personal injury defense attorneys were less supportive of mandatory ADR
policies than were personal injury plaintiffs' attorneys (t(226) = -2.69, p < .01); see also
WAYNE D. BRAZIL, SETrLING CIviL Surrs 112 (1985) (noting that defense counsel were
less likely than plaintiffs' attorneys to "believe that settlement conferences should be
mandatory in most cases in federal court").
127 Benefits: r(417) = -.411, p <.001. Settlement rate: r(394) = -.151, p <.01.
128 r(414) = -.134, p < .01. Attorneys who strongly opposed being required to
discuss or use ADR actually discussed ADR with clients, on average, in 74% of their
cases, while attorneys who strongly supported those requirements discussed ADR with
clients, on average, in 84% of their cases.
129 r(419) = -.202, p < .001. Attorneys who strongly opposed being required to
discuss or use ADR actually discussed ADR with opposing counsel, on average, in 51%
of their cases, whereas attorneys who strongly supported those requirements discussed
ADR with opposing counsel, on average, in 72% of their cases.
130 Although attorneys' overall attitudes toward mandatory ADR discussions and
use were not related to the timing of ADR discussions, views about a requirement to
discuss ADR early were. Attorneys who opposed being required to discuss ADR early,
not surprisingly, were less likely to actually discuss ADR early (r(392) = -.122, p < .05).
Attitudes toward mandatory ADR conferences and mandatory ADR use were not related
to the timing of attorneys' ADR discussions.
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attorneys who were less supportive of ADR conferences and mandated ADR
use were less likely to use voluntary ADR processes. 131
C. Judicial Encouragement of ADR
Attorneys reported that the court suggested the use of an ADR process,
on average, in 30% of their cases. 132 Twenty-eight percent of attorneys said
the court suggested using ADR in three-fourths or more of their cases, 133
whereas 39% said the court suggested ADR in fewer than one-fourth of their
cases.
Table 9. Judges Suggested ADR Use
In this percentage This percentage of
of their cases: attorneys said the court
suggested ADR
none of their cases 14%
less than 1/4 of cases 25%
1/4 to less than half of cases 15%
half to less than 3/4 of cases 18%
3/4 to all of their cases 28%
Attorneys who reported that the court suggested ADR in fewer of their
131 r(418) = -. 173, p < .001. Attorneys who strongly opposed being required to
discuss or use ADR actually used ADR, on average, in 36% of their cases, whereas
attorneys who strongly supported those requirements used ADR, on average, in 52% of
their cases.
132 The attorneys appear to have answered this question in terms of the percentage
of their cases in which a judge would have had the opportunity to suggest ADR, rather
than in terms of the percentage of all of their filed cases, because there was no
relationship between the frequency of judicial encouragement of ADR and the rate of
bilateral negotiated settlements or early settlements. (Obviously, judges would not meet
with, nor suggest using ADR to, attorneys in cases that had already settled.) This suggests
that the frequency of judicial encouragement of ADR is not confounded with the rate of
negotiated settlements, thus limiting this possible alternative interpretation of the findings
of the relationships between judicial encouragement and ADR discussions and use. See
infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
133 See Table 9.
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cases were less likely to discuss ADR with their clients 134 and with opposing
counsel. 135 They were also less likely to discuss ADR early in their cases. 136
In addition, attorneys who reported that the court suggested ADR in fewer of
their cases also used voluntary ADR processes in fewer cases. 137
D. Summary: The Relative and Combined Impact of the Barriers on
ADR Discussions and Use
The research findings are consistent with assumptions that certain ADR-
specific factors act as barriers to attorneys' voluntary discussion and use of
ADR. In terms of both their relative and combined impacts, the factors had
fairly similar effects on the frequency of attorneys' ADR discussions with
clients and with opposing counsel, and on the frequency of their ADR use.
The factors had different effects, however, on the timing of ADR
discussions.
The factor that had by far the strongest relationship with how frequently
attorneys discussed and used ADR was how frequently judges suggested the
use of ADR processes. 138 Attorneys' views regarding ADR's benefits tended
to have the second strongest relationship with the frequency of ADR
discussions and use, followed by the settlement rate they had experienced in
their ADR cases. Attorneys' familiarity with ADR, beliefs that proposing
ADR would be viewed as a sign of weakness, and opposition to mandatory
ADR policies also had statistically significant relationships with the
134 r(409) = .372, p < .001. Attorneys who said the court suggested using ADR in
fewer than one-fourth of their cases discussed ADR with clients, on average, in 63% of
their cases, whereas attorneys who said the court suggested using ADR in more than
three-fourths of their cases discussed ADR with clients, on average, in 90% of their
cases.
135 r(413) = .450, p < .001. Attorneys who said the court suggested using ADR in
fewer than one-fourth of their cases discussed ADR with opposing counsel, on average,
in 42% of their cases, whereas attorneys who said the court suggested using ADR in more
than three-fourths of their cases discussed ADR with opposing counsel, on average, in
78% of their cases.
136 r(387) = .106, p < .05. Attorneys who said the court suggested using ADR in
fewer than one-fourth of their cases regularly discussed ADR early, on average, in 25%
of their cases, whereas attorneys who said the court suggested using ADR in more than
three-fourths of their cases regularly discussed ADR early, on average, in 38% of their
cases.
137 r(413) = .424, p < .001. Attorneys who said the court suggested using ADR in
fewer than one-fourth of their cases used ADR, on average, in 27% of their cases,
whereas attorneys who said the court suggested using ADR in more than three-fourths of
their cases used ADR, on average, in 57% of their cases.
138 See Table 10.
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frequency of ADR discussions and use. However, attorneys' views about
whether ADR provided free discovery or whether the supply of qualified
neutrals was sufficient were not related to how frequently they discussed or
used ADR.139
In contrast, only three factors had statistically significant, and generally
smaller, relationships with how frequently attorneys discussed ADR with
opposing counsel early in their cases: whether they thought ADR offered
benefits, their familiarity with ADR, and the frequency with which the court
suggested ADR.140
139 Accordingly, these two measures are not included in analyses examining the
combined impact of the factors.
14 0 See Table 10.
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Table 10. Relationships between ADR-Specific Factors
and How Frequently Attorneys:
II ~ Discussed1
iscussed D iscuwith DiscussedADR with Used
ADR-Specific ADR with opposing ADR early ADR
Factors their clients opsn in cases
________________________ILcounsel________
court suggested .37 .45 .11 .42
ADR more often
thought ADR has .23 .30 .17 .25
benefits
had more
settlements in .19 .26 ns .24
ADR
had greater ADR .23 .22 .16 .10
knowledge
thought ADR seen -.17 -.18 ns -.21
as weakness
opposed
mandatory ADR -.13 -.20 ns -.17
policies
thought ADR gave
free discovery
thought not enough
qualified neutrals ___1_1___
Notes: Numbers in table are Pearson r's; ns indicates the correlation
coefficient was not statistically significant.
Taken together, these factors were strongly related to how often attorneys
discussed and used ADR, but were only modestly related to when they
discussed ADR. Combined, judicial encouragement of ADR and attorneys'
knowledge and views of ADR explained 20% of the variation in how often
attorneys discussed ADR with their clients, 141 29% of the variation in how
often they discussed ADR with opposing counsel, 142 and 26% of the
variation in how often they used voluntary ADR processes. 143 But these
factors explained only 6% of the variation in how often attorneys discussed
ADR early in their cases. 144 These findings suggest that other factors not
included in the present study, such as perceived or real information needs,
lack of deadlines, and the habits and routines of practice account for some of
the variation not explained by the present factors, particularly with regard to
the timing of ADR discussions. 145
To illustrate the potential cumulative impact of the barriers, we took a
subset of the factors-specifically, attorneys' ADR knowledge, views, and
attitudes-and compared attorneys who were below the median on each of
these dimensions with those who were above the median on each. 146
Attorneys who were below the median on each of these dimensions discussed
ADR with clients in 59% of their cases and with opposing counsel in 46% of
their cases, and used ADR in 30% of their cases. By comparison, attorneys
who were above the median on each of these dimensions discussed ADR
with clients in 91% of their cases and with opposing counsel in 83% of their
cases, and used ADR in 61% of their cases.
Taken together, the extent of judicial encouragement of ADR, attorneys'
knowledge and views of ADR, and attorneys' ADR discussions with clients
and opposing counsel explained 50% of the variation in the frequency of
attorneys' ADR use. 147 Judicial encouragement and attorneys' ADR
knowledge and views primarily exerted their influence on attorneys' use of
141 F(6, 373) = 15.36, p < .001, R = .447, R2 = .20.
142 F(6, 375) = 25.20, p < .001, R =.539, R2 = .29.
143 F(6, 375) = 22.54, p < .001, R = .510, R2 = .26.
144 F(6, 367) = 4.08, p < .01, R = .245, R2 = .06.
145 That case mix, negotiation routines, or other aspects of litigation practice might
play a larger role in the timing of ADR discussions than ADR-specific factors is
supported by several findings: the relationship between the timing of ADR and settlement
discussions, and the fact that business attorneys were more likely than personal injury
attorneys to discuss both settlement and ADR early. See supra notes 77, 80 and
accompanying text.
146 The median is the value corresponding to the 50th percentile. RUNYON & HABER,
supra note 63, at 95. For the purpose of this analysis, adjustments were made so that
"above the median" would correspond to greater familiarity with and more favorable
views of ADR.
147 F(8, 371) = 45.55, p <.001, R = .704, R 2 = .496.
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ADR indirectly, through their influence on how often attorneys discussed
ADR with clients and opposing counsel, which in turn strongly affected
ADR use. 148 After controlling for the frequency of attorneys' discussions
with both clients and opposing counsel, judicial encouragement and
attorneys' knowledge and views of ADR had a statistically significant but
small independent impact on ADR use, explaining only an additional 4% of
the variation in ADR use. 149
VI. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS FOR
ADR POLICY
A. Summary
Discussing ADR processes has become a common practice for Arizona
civil litigation attorneys, although not in all of their cases. Three-fourths of
attorneys discussed ADR with their clients in three-fourths or more of their
cases.1 50 Attorneys discussed ADR with opposing counsel less frequently,
with nearly half of the attorneys doing so in three-fourths or more of their
cases. 151 These ADR discussions generally did not take place early in the life
of a case.152 Nor did ADR discussions automatically translate into ADR use:
one-fifth of attorneys used voluntary ADR processes in three-fourths or more
of their cases. 153 Although attorneys who more frequently discussed ADR
with clients and opposing counsel used voluntary ADR processes more often,
those who tended to discuss ADR early were not more likely to use ADR. 154
The findings are consistent with assumptions that certain ADR-specific
148 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
149 R2 change = .044, F(6, 371) = 5.34, p < .001. By comparison, the frequency of
attorneys' ADR discussions with clients and opposing counsel explained an additional
23% of the variation in the frequency of ADR use, after controlling for judicial
encouragement and attorneys' ADR knowledge and views (R2 change = .231, F(2,37 1) =
85.04, p < .001). R2 change indicates the extent to which a second set of variables adds to
the correlation, over and above the contribution of a prior set of variables. See Mark H.
Licht, Multiple Regression and Correlation, in READING AND UNDERSTANDING
MULITVARIATE STATISTICS 19, 42-43 (Laurence G. Grimm & Paul R. Yarnold eds.,
1995); TABACHNICK & FIDELL, supra note 87, at 102-03. The timing of discussions was
not included in these analyses because it was not related to the frequency of ADR use.
See supra note 86.
150 See Table 1 and accompanying text.
151 Id.
152 See Table 2 and accompanying text.
153 See Table 3 and accompanying text.
154 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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factors constrain attorneys' voluntary discussion and use of ADR. Attorneys
who reported less judicial encouragement of ADR, a lower rate of settlement
in ADR cases, less familiarity with ADR, less favorable views of ADR, and
less support for mandatory ADR policies tended to discuss and use ADR in a
smaller proportion of their cases. 155 Taken together, these factors were
strongly related to how often attorneys voluntarily discussed and used ADR.
Attorneys' views regarding whether ADR provided free discovery or whether
the supply of qualified neutrals was sufficient were not related to how often
they discussed or used ADR.
Only a subset of these factors-attorneys' views regarding ADR's
benefits, their familiarity with the processes, and the degree of judicial
encouragement of ADR use-were related to how often attorneys first
discussed ADR early in a case, and their combined impact was small. 156
These ADR-specific factors apparently play less of a role in the timing of
ADR discussions than do other factors, such as those that affect the timing of
the negotiation process more generally. 157
Despite the strong relationship between these factors and attorneys'
discussion and use of ADR, most of the barriers were not widespread. That
is, fewer than one-fifth of the attorneys were unfamiliar with the various
ADR processes, thought others viewed proposing ADR as a sign of
weakness, reported that fewer than half of their ADR cases had settled, or
thought ADR did not offer substantial benefits, greater client satisfaction,
and earlier settlements. 158 A larger proportion of attorneys, however,
reported a low rate of judicial encouragement of ADR and were opposed to
mandates requiring the discussion and use of ADR. 159
B. Implications for Policies to Increase Voluntary ADR Use
In this section, we discuss what the findings of the present study and
other empirical studies suggest about the potential effectiveness of two
approaches for increasing voluntary ADR use, namely expanded ADR
education and mandated ADR consideration. First, however, we must note a
caution in extrapolating from the findings of the present study, based on data
regarding voluntary discussions, to situations that involve mandatory
consideration of ADR. Once the voluntary aspect of ADR discussions is
155 See Table 10 and accompanying text.
15 6 Id.
157 See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
158 See Tables 4-6 and accompanying text.
159 See Tables 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
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removed, the comparative and the combined impacts of the various factors
on ADR use could be dramatically different.
1. Expanding ADR Education and Information
One set of proposals to increase voluntary ADR use focuses on
increasing attorneys' familiarity with ADR, either through the expansion of
law school or continuing education course offerings16° or through ADR
information provided by the court at the time of filing. 161 The present study
found that attorneys who were less familiar with ADR were less likely to
discuss and use ADR. In addition, attorneys who were less knowledgeable
about ADR were less likely to think ADR offered benefits and were more
likely to think proposing ADR signaled weakness, and attorneys who held
these views discussed and used ADR less often.
Thus, these findings suggest that efforts to increase attorneys' familiarity
with ADR processes might increase how often they discuss and use ADR.
And, presumably, educational efforts also would enhance the effective use of
ADR by giving attorneys a better understanding of which processes address
which sources of impasse or client goals and how the different processes
could be structured or combined to address case-specific needs. 162 The
findings of other studies, however, suggest that the impact of increased ADR
education on ADR use might be small, and smaller than if the increased
familiarity had been acquired instead through direct experience with ADR
processes. 163
The impact of ADR information, education, and training might be
enhanced if it is targeted not only at attorneys but also at judges and regular
160 See, e.g., Court ADR, supra note 15, at 133; Folberg et al., supra note 1, at 370-
71, 397-98; Riskin, supra note 11, at 49-51; Rosenberg & Folberg, supra note 7, at
1542; Schmitz, supra note 14, at 31.
161 See, e.g., CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION
PROGRAMS §§ 1.6, 3.1, 3.2 and associated commentary (1992); Folberg et al., supra note
1, at 371, 384, 409; Rosenberg & Folberg, supra note 7, at 1542; see also, CAL. R. CT.
201.9 (2003); MASS. R. SuP. JUD. CT. 1:18, 5 (2003); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.03(a)
(2001); Mo. SuP. CT. R. 17.02(a) (2002); PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 3, at 71-
308 (summarizing the practices in each federal district court).
162 See, e.g., Folberg et al., supra note 1, at 392-94; Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen
B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR
Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49, 51-59 (1994); McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 537-
39.
163 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. This is one argument for
mandating ADR use, at least in the short term. See, e.g., Folberg et al., supra note 1, at
398; Rogers & McEwen, supra note 4, at 864; Wissler, supra note 5, at 238.
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users of legal services. 164 In the present study, judicial encouragement of
ADR use was the factor that had the strongest impact on the frequency of
attorneys' discussion and use of ADR. Judges' greater familiarity with the
various ADR processes might enhance their ability to discuss ADR with
attorneys and their willingness to suggest the use of ADR. 165 Efforts to
inform "repeat player" litigants about ADR processes 166 might lead them to
be more receptive to their attorneys' presentation of those options, although
direct experience with ADR is likely to have an even greater effect.
Educational efforts alone, however, are likely to have a limited impact on
ADR use because they address only a subset of the barriers to considering
ADR.
2. Mandating ADR Discussions with Clients or Opposing Counsel
Other proposed approaches to increase voluntary ADR use are to
encourage or require attorneys to discuss the possible use of ADR with their
clients, 167 with opposing counsel, 168 or with both. These duties have been
164 See also Welsh & McAdoo, supra note 15, at 13-14; Folberg et al., supra note 1,
at 365, 371, 381; McAdoo, supra note 4, at 443; McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5, at
537.
165 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
166 See Phillips, supra note 5, at 6 tbl.2 (finding that 60% of in-house entertainment
counsel reported their executives were not knowledgeable about mediation and
arbitration); Goodpaster, supra note 11, at 235.
167 See, e.g., MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.03(b) (2001); MASS. R. SUP. JUD. CT. 1:18,
5 (2003); MASS. R. SUP. JUD. CT. 3:07, 1.4, Cmt. [5] (2002); Mo. SuP. CT. R. 17.02(b)
(2002); N.J. R. GEN. APPLIC. 1:40-1 (2002); N.D. R. CT. 8.8(a) (2002); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-7-204 (Michie 1999); STARK COUNTY, OHIO LOCAL R. CT. 16.03 (2002); NUECES
COUNTY, TEx. R. 7 (2002); TEx. LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM
U.11 (2003); ALASKA R. PROF. CONDUCT 2.1 (2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4102
(West Supp. 2002); COLO. R. PROF. CONDUCT 2.1 (2003); OHIO SUP. CT. R. FOR THE
GOV'T OF THE BAR, app. V, A Lawyer's Aspirational Ideals (b)(1) (2002); HAW. R. PROF.
CONDUCT 2.1 (2002); DEL. SUP. CT. R. 71(b)(ii), STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF LAWYER
CONDUCT B (2003); CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 161, § 3.3 and associated commentary (stating that courts
should encourage attorneys to inform clients about mediation); Folberg et al., supra note
1, at 384, 409. All federal district courts require litigants in most categories of civil cases
"to consider" the use of an ADR process. 28 U.S.C. § 652(a) (2003). In jurisdictions
where attorneys are required to confer about ADR with opposing counsel, attorneys
would implicitly be required to discuss ADR options with their clients. See infra note
168. This would also be the case where ADR use is discussed during a pretrial or
scheduling conference. See infra notes 202-03. For additional rules, statutes, professional
conduct codes, or ethics opinions encouraging or requiring attorneys to discuss ADR with
clients, see Breger, supra note 14, app. I; COLE ET AL., supra note 3, § 4.3 (noting a
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incorporated in aspirational creeds, professional responsibility or ethics
codes, and statutes or court rules.169 The nature of the obligation to consult
with clients about ADR ranges from simply advising clients of the
availability of ADR processes or giving them the court's ADR brochure, 170
to providing an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of available
ADR options and assistance in selecting the most appropriate process. 171
Will these suggestions or requirements increase the frequency of
attorneys' ADR discussions and, if so, will that result in increased voluntary
ADR use? Several empirical studies 172 that examined the effects of different
types of obligations to discuss ADR shed some light on these issues, but they
do not provide a clear picture of the effectiveness of such requirements.
"small movement" to require or encourage attorneys to advise clients regarding ADR);
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., ADR, the ABA, and Client Control: A Proposal that the Model
Rules Require Lawyers to Present ADR Options to Clients, 41 S. TEx. L. REv. 183, 188-
89, 197 (1999); Arthur Garwin, Show Me the Offer: When Opposing Counsel Suggests
Mediation, Your Client Needs to Know, A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 84, 84.
Several commentators argue that even when attorneys do not have an explicit duty
to discuss ADR with their clients, they have an implicit obligation under many existing
codes of conduct and professional responsibility. See, e.g., Frank E.A. Sander,
Professional Responsibility: Should There Be a Duty to Advise of ADR Options? Yes: An
Aid to Clients, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1990, at 50, 50; Robert B. Moberly, Ethical Standards for
Court-Appointed Mediators and Florida's Mandatory Mediation Experiment, 21 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 701, 726 (1994); Schmitz, supra note 14, at 33-35; Breger, supra note 14, at
458. But see Michael L. Prigoff, Professional Responsibility: Should There Be a Duty to
Advise of ADR Options? No: An Unreasonable Burden, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1990, at 51, 51.
168 See, e.g., ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 16(g)(2) (2002); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.04 (2001);
STARK COUNTY, OHIO LOCAL R. CT. 16.03 (2002); N.D. R. CT. 8.8(a) (2002); ALASKA R.
Civ. P. 26(f) (2001); HAw. R. CIR. CTs. 12(b)(6) (2002); D.C. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) (2003);
Folberg et. al., supra note 1, at 386, 409. In their local rules, many federal district courts
explicitly require attorneys to discuss ADR with opposing counsel at the Rule 26(f)
conference. See, e.g., D. ALASKA, LOCAL R. 16.2(b)(2) (2002); D.D.C. LOCAL Civ. R.
16.3(c)(5) (2003); D. IDAHO CIv. R. 16.1 (2003); N.D. IND. LOCAL R. 16.6(b) (2002); D.
MINN. LOCAL R. 16.1(d), 26.1(0(2) (2003); D. ME. CIv. R. 83.11 (b)(1) (2002); D. MASS.
LOCAL R. 16.1(D)(3)(b) (2003); see also PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 3, at 8,
71-308 (summarizing the practices in each federal district court).
169 Breger, supra note 14, at 452-57; Cochran, Jr., supra note 167, at 200.
170 See, e.g., MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.03(b) (2001); Mo. SUP. CT. R. 17.02(b)
(2002); N.J. R. GEN. APPLIC. 1:40-1 (2002).
171 See, e.g., MASS. R. SUP. JUD. CT. 1:18, 5 (2003); MASS. R. SuP. JUD. CT. 3:07,
1.4, Cmt. [5] (2002); Mo. SUP. CT. R. 17.02(b) (2002); STARK COUNTY, OHIO LOCAL R.
CT. 16.03 (2002); see Breger, supra note 14, at 439-41 (referring to these extremes as
"weak" and "hard" consultation).
172 See generally McAdoo, supra note 4; McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5;
Powell, supra note 5.
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The studies reported a moderate level of ADR discussions, 173 revealing
less-than-complete attorney compliance with their obligation. Although
almost all Georgia attorneys felt they had an obligation to counsel clients
about ADR under an ethical code provision, only 27% always told their
clients about ADR, and 37% frequently did so. 174 Under a mandatory
advising rule, 32% of Missouri attorneys discussed ADR with clients within
the first three months of filing suit, and another 30% did so within the next
three months. 175 Under a mandatory conferring rule, 40% of Minnesota
attorneys usually or always conferred with opposing counsel about ADR
within the time period by which they were required to confer and report to
the court. 176 The rate of compliance appeared to be higher (54%) in a county
in which the court devoted substantial resources to enforcing the rule. 177
Two of these studies also examined the frequency of attorneys' ADR
use, and both reported an increase following the enactment of mandatory
discussion rules. In one study, half of the Missouri attorneys said their ADR
use increased in the two years following the adoption of a rule requiring them
to inform clients of the availability of ADR programs. 178 In addition to
requiring client advising, the rule specified that the court would notify the
parties about ADR services 179 and authorized the implementation of new
ADR programs and the judicial referral of cases to non-binding ADR
173 We cannot tell whether this rate of ADR discussions represents an increase or no
change from prior practice, as the studies did not obtain baseline data before the
discussion obligations went into effect.
174 Powell, supra note 5, at 6 (finding that 30% occasionally told their clients about
ADR and 6% never did). At the time of the survey, Ethical Consideration 7-5 read: "A
lawyer as advisor has a duty to advise the client as to various forms of dispute resolution.
When a matter is likely to involve litigation, a lawyer has a duty to inform the client of
forms of dispute resolution which might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation."
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ORG. AND Gov'T OF THE STATE BAR OF GA., 3-107
(EC 7-5) (1999).
175 McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 497 tbl.14 (finding that 22% discussed
ADR later, and 16% hardly ever discussed ADR options with clients). The rule did not
contain either a deadline for conferring with clients or a certification or reporting
requirement. See Mo. SUP. CT. R. 17.02(b) (2001).
176 McAdoo, supra note 4, at 425 (finding that 33% sometimes conferred with
opposing counsel during this time period, and 26% never or rarely did so). See MINN.
GEN. R. PRAC. 114 (2001).
177 McAdoo, supra note 4, at 425 n.70.
178 McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 490-91 tbl.8 (finding that 40% reported no
change, and 4% reported less ADR use). Despite their reports of increased ADR use, only
3% of attorneys used ADR in more than half of their cases during those two years, and
80% used ADR in fewer than one-fourth of their cases. Id. at 577 q.17.
179 Mo. SuP. CT. R. 17.02(a) (2002).
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processes. 180 Accordingly, we do not know how much of the reported
increase in ADR use was due to the mandatory advising requirement per se
and how much was due to these other changes authorized by the rule. 181
In the second study, 78% of Minnesota attorneys reported that they used
ADR more in the two years that a mandatory conferring rule had been in
effect. 182 This rule required attorneys to give their clients court-provided
information on available ADR processes and neutrals, to discuss ADR with
opposing counsel, and to report the outcome of those discussions to the court
within sixty days after the case was filed. 183 In addition, the rule authorized
judges to schedule a conference within one month of that reporting deadline
if the attorneys could not agree on an ADR process or if the judge did not
approve of their agreement. 184 We cannot discern the relative contributions
that these various components of the rule made to the reported increase in
ADR use. Further, because the rule also authorized judges to order the use of
non-binding ADR processes, and they did so, 185 an unknown amount of the
increased ADR use was truly voluntary. 186
180 Mo. SuP. CT. R. 17.01(a), 17.03(a)-(b) (2002).
181 Because judges intervened in approximately only one-fourth of cases in which
parties disagreed about ADR or agreed that it was not appropriate, judicial involvement
probably played a limited role in the reported increase in ADR use. See McAdoo &
Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 582 q.29, 31. The point remains, however, that the reported
increase in ADR use could be due to any relevant changes that might have occurred
following the adoption of the rule, and the study did not examine or control for these
potential confounds. In addition, because the attorneys were surveyed about both their
pre- and post-rule use after the rule went into effect, the survey findings are more subject
to potential problems of recall and reactivity (i.e., attorneys altering their responses in
reaction to the perceived purpose of the survey) than if the attorneys had been surveyed
about their pre-rule ADR use before its implementation. See generally CLAIRE SELLTIZ ET
AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS 125-27 (3d ed. 1976); FLOYD J.
FOWLER, JR., SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS 92-93 (1988).
182 McAdoo, supra note 4, at 467 q.14 (finding that 18% reported no change in
ADR use, and fewer than 1% reported decreased ADR use). Sixty-four percent of
attorneys used ADR in most or all of their cases during those two years. Id. q. 18.
183 See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.03, 114.04(a) (2001).
184 MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.04(b) (2001). The court scheduled a conference in
40% of the cases in which parties disagreed about ADR and 25% of the cases in which
the parties agreed that ADR was not appropriate. McAdoo, supra note 4, at 470-71 q.28,
30.
185 MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.04(b) (2001). The court selected an ADR process or
ordered the parties to find one in 64% of the cases in which the parties disagreed about
ADR and in 19% of the cases in which the parties agreed that ADR was not appropriate.
McAdoo, supra note 4, at 470-71 q.28, 30.
186 The other methodological concerns discussed above also apply to this study. See
supra note 181.
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Drawing conclusions from these studies about how effective discussion
requirements could be in increasing voluntary ADR use is difficult because
the studies examined different rules with different components in different
jurisdictions with different legal and judicial ADR cultures. Overall, the
findings seem to suggest that the components of a mandatory discussion rule
that would enhance its effectiveness include: a requirement that attorneys
provide their clients ADR information and discuss ADR with opposing
counsel; a deadline by which the discussions must take place, a reporting
requirement, and enforcement; a court conference to assist attorneys in
choosing an ADR process; and active judicial involvement. The findings of
the present study shed further light on why these components seem likely to
enhance the effectiveness of mandatory ADR discussion requirements in
increasing voluntary ADR use, and on what other components might be
helpful.
A rule that requires ADR discussions would enable attorneys to attribute
their discussion of ADR processes to that obligation rather than to their own
or their client's interest, which might reduce "sign of weakness" concerns. 1
87
The present study found that attorneys who thought proposing ADR signaled
weakness were less likely to discuss ADR with clients or with opposing
counsel, and less likely to use ADR. Thus, if a discussion requirement
reduces weakness concerns, the frequency of ADR discussions and use might
increase. Requiring attorneys to confer with opposing counsel should be
more effective than requiring them only to advise clients, as this would
reduce the effects of weakness concerns that were observed at both of these
steps. In addition, to the extent that the opponent's proposal of ADR would
be attributed to a discussion requirement rather than to an effort to gain
strategic advantage, reactive devaluation of ADR proposals should be
reduced, which could increase ADR use. But these concerns would be
successfully eliminated only if virtually all attorneys comply with the
mandatory discussion rule; otherwise, speculations about the motivation
underlying ADR discussions would remain.
If such rules do not induce or require attorneys to become more
knowledgeable about the different ADR processes and their relative
appropriateness in different cases, they might still be reluctant to discuss
ADR, and their discussions might not produce increased ADR use. Because
attorneys in the present study who were less familiar with ADR were less
likely to discuss and use ADR, adding an educational component to
mandatory advising rules might be necessary to increase not only the
frequency of ADR discussion and use, but also the more effective choice of a
process from among ADR options.
187 See also Folberg et al., supra note 1, at 386.
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Obviously, mandatory discussion rules do not require that attorneys
enthusiastically recommend the use of ADR. Attorneys with unfavorable
views might present ADR in a negative light, engage in a perfunctory
discussion that barely meets their obligation, or avoid discussing ADR
altogether. 188 To the extent that attorneys interpret discussion requirements as
a sign of court support for ADR, their views of ADR's value and
appropriateness might be enhanced. 189 if so, attorneys' willingness to discuss
and use ADR might be increased, based on the present study's finding of a
relationship between attorneys' views of ADR and their frequency of ADR
discussions and use. However, because attorneys' views of ADR will be only
as favorable as the experiences they and their colleagues have with the ADR
processes they use, courts also need to address issues of the quality and
availability of their ADR programs. 190
To enhance their effectiveness, mandatory ADR discussion rules would
need to include additional components that address those barriers to ADR
discussion and use that are associated with strategic behavior and the routines
of negotiation and litigation practice. 191 In order that attorneys do not
indefinitely put off assessing the ADR potential of cases while discovery
progresses and the parties jockey for strategic advantage, rules would need to
include a deadline by which discussions 192 have to take place. 93 The
188 See Breger, supra note 14, at 441 (speculating that attorneys will do only
minimal client advising unless a more thorough consultation is specified); Cochran, Jr.,
supra note 167, at 200 (suggesting that under mandatory advising rules, attorneys might
present ADR options "in a pro forma manner that is unlikely to cause clients to seriously
consider ADR"); Lande, supra note 5, at 223 ("Parties and attorneys who do not believe
in mediation can certainly find ways to evade and subvert mandates for consultations
about ADR ... .They can 'go through the motions' of having consultations.., without
seriously intending to consider ADR .... ).
One wonders whether the exchange, "I don't think ADR is appropriate for this case,
do you?" "No," would meet the "discussion" requirement. If so, this would provide
attorneys with an easy "out," because courts appear reluctant to intervene when the
parties have agreed that ADR is not appropriate. See McAdoo, supra note 4, at 470-71
qq.29-30; McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 582 qq.30-31. In both studies,
approximately three-fourths of attorneys had at least one case in the prior two years in
which they and opposing counsel both agreed that ADR was not appropriate, and the
court did not get involved in a majority of those cases.
189 See Breger, supra note 14, at 455; Rogers & McEwen, supra note 4, at 845;
Lande, supra note 5, at 221; Macfarlane, supra note 11, at 315, 321.
190 See also Court ADR, supra note 15, at 133 (arguing that programs need to have a
publicized quality control mechanism to address attorneys' concerns); Folberg et al.,
supra note 1, at 400.
191 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
192 Perhaps if discussion rules required attorneys to discuss not only ADR use but
also more general settlement possibilities, this might further encourage attorneys to focus
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discussion deadline should be set early enough to promote earlier
settlements, 194 but not so early that the parties are unable to make an
informed decision about settlement or ADR use. 195 The appropriate timing
likely will vary across different jurisdictions depending on existing practice
norms and case management practices. 196 Some mechanism of making the
on the case earlier and to view the consideration of ADR as part of the routine litigation
and case management processes. See Folberg et al., supra note 1, at 386. Many existing
rules that require opposing counsel to confer about ADR also require the discussion of
settlement, discovery, or other case management issues at the same time. See supra note
168. The findings of the present study suggest that attorneys tended to discuss ADR with
opposing counsel only after they first tried to negotiate a settlement. To the extent that
attorneys would prefer to try to settle cases without assistance, they may dismiss the use
of ADR if they are required to consider ADR before they have explored settlement
possibilities.
193 See Macfarlane, supra note 11, at 289-90; Court ADR, supra note 15, at 133;
Folberg, et al., supra note 1, at 359; HYMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 81, 157, 164 (noting
that attorneys' negotiation practices seemed to involve repetition of habitual patterns
rather than planning and active management). See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 16(g)(2)(A)
(2002); W.D. OF WIS. CT. R. 3(A) (2002); McAdoo, supra note 4, at 425. In jurisdictions
where ADR must be discussed at a Rule 26(f) conference, the conference date serves as a
deadline if no earlier deadline is specified. See supra note 168. This is also the case in
jurisdictions where ADR must be discussed during a scheduling or pretrial conference.
See infra notes 202-03.
194 In the present study, attorneys who were more likely to discuss settlement or
ADR early in their cases reported earlier settlements. See supra note 86.
195 See, e.g., HYMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 161 ("learning or developing the
settlement value of the case is a necessary condition for settlement"); McAdoo, supra
note 4, at 425 (finding that some attorneys said the 60-day post-filing deadline was too
early to choose an appropriate ADR process); RICHARD J. MAIMAN ET AL., THE MAINE
SUPERIOR COURT ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PILOT PROJECT, PROGRAM
EVALUATION FINAL REPORT app. C at 11 (Jan. 31, 1999) (finding that nearly all of the
interviewed attorneys and neutrals who had participated in a court conference to discuss
ADR and settlement thought the conference was more effective when it was held six
months rather than three months after case filing, because they had more information
about the case). For instance, the date by which Arizona attorneys are required to discuss
ADR and settlement with opposing counsel is nearly two months after they are required
to disclose the factual and legal bases of their claims and defenses and exchange relevant
documents, so presumably they would have basic case information before they must
confer. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 16(g)(2), 26.1 (2002).
196 See, e.g., DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
COMMITrEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE
DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF
1990 at 237, 271 (Jan. 24, 1997) (finding that more than twice as many attorneys in one
court in which mediation generally occurred after discovery was completed said
mediation took place "too early" as in another court in which mediation occurred within a
month or two after the case was filed). Different deadlines might be appropriate for
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deadline enforceable, such as requiring attorneys to certify their compliance
or to report the outcome of their discussions to the court, 197 accompanied by
active enforcement, might increase the likelihood that timely ADR
discussions actually occur. 198 Of course, enforcement is not without potential
costs for the courts, attorneys, and litigants. 199
A level of court involvement in the process of ADR discussions that is
more substantive than simply monitoring compliance is likely to further
increase ADR use. The present study found that judicial encouragement was
the factor that had the single greatest impact on the frequency of attorneys'
ADR discussions and use. The Minnesota and Missouri studies, taken
together, suggest that active judicial involvement in considering ADR
stimulated attorneys to discuss and voluntarily use ADR, while lack of
judicial involvement had the opposite effect.2°° Several studies have found
that attorneys welcome active judicial involvement in settlement
negotiations. 20 1 And in the present study, almost half of the attorneys
supported a mandatory pretrial conference to discuss ADR if the parties
could not agree on an ADR process.
One method of increasing court involvement would be to include the
consideration of ADR options in a status, case management, or other pretrial
conference. ADR already is a permissible topic of discussion at pretrial
conferences in some jurisdictions20 2 and is a required topic in others.20 3 But
different types of cases to accommodate apparent differences in when critical information
is available. See supra note 77.
197 See, e.g., ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 16(g)(2)(B) (2002); N.D. R. CT. 8.8 (2002); MINN.
GEN. R. PRAC. 114.04 (2001); MASS. R. SUP. JUD. CT. 1:18, 5 (2003); ALASKA R. Civ. P.
26(f) (2001); HAW. R. CIR. CTS. 12(b)(6) (2002); D. MASS. LOCAL R. 16.1(D)(3) (2003);
W.D. OKLA. LOCAL Civ. R. 16.3(c) (2003); D. S.C. LOCAL Civ. R. 16.03 (2003); W.D.
TEx. CIv. R. CV-88(b) (2003). In federal district courts that do not explicitly ask
attorneys to certify that ADR was discussed, the local rules typically require attorneys to
report their decisions about the use of ADR as part of the Rule 26(f) case management
plan they must file with the court. See, e.g., S.D. IND. LOCAL R. 16.1(d)(2)(J) (2003); D.
MINN. LOCAL R. 16.1(d) (2003); D. N.D. LOCAL R. 16.2(B) (2003); N. AND S.D. Miss.
UNIF. LOCAL R. 16.1 (B)(1)(e) (2002).
198 See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text. But even with the enforcement
of a required deadline for reporting to the court, just over half of Minnesota attorneys
usually or always discussed ADR options within the required time period. See McAdoo,
supra note 4, at 425.
199 See Breger, supra note 14, at 441-46, 455-57.
200 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
201 BRAZIL, supra note 126, at 1-2; Heumann & Hyman, supra note 11, at 287;
HYMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 40-41.
202 See, e.g., ALASKA R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5), 16(c)(9) (2002); IDAHO R. Civ. P.
16(a)(6), 16(c)(7) (2003); IND. R. TRIAL P. 16(A)(6) (2003); KAN. CIV. P. CODE § 60-
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while some of these conferences occur early, others occur late in the life of
the case, reducing their potential to facilitate earlier settlements and reduce
litigation costs. 2°4 Thus, discussion rules might need to include a provision
that specifies that ADR is a topic to be discussed at an early case
management conference or that establishes an early ADR conference. 20 5 The
impact of discussing ADR on ADR use at such conferences is not clear. 20 6
At a minimum, an early conference would provide another deadline and
an event that would help force busy attorneys to assess the settlement and
ADR potential of their cases earlier. 207 But a court conference also could
216(b)(2) (2002); WYo. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(9) (2003); MICH. CT. R. 2.401(C)(1)(h) (2003);
N.H. R. SUPER. CT. 62 (2002); MD. R. Civ. P. 2-504.1(c)(1) (2002); D. KAN. R. OF PRAC.
16.2 (b)(10) (2002); E.D. CAL. LOCAL R. PRAC. 16-240(a)(16) (2003); see generally FED.
R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9) ("the use of special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute" is a
subject for consideration at pretrial conferences). For additional rules regarding the
discussion of ADR at pretrial conferences, see Breger, supra note 14, at app. II.
203 See, e.g., STARK COUNTY, OHIO LOCAL R. CT. 16.03 (2002); CONN. R. SUPER.
CT. § 14-13(9) (2002); HAW. R. CtR. CTS. 12(c)(1)(B) (2002); ILL. S. CT. R. 218(a)(7)
(2003); CAL. CODE CIv. P. § 1734(b) (2003); D.C. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (2003); E., M., AND
W.D. OF LA. UNW. LOCAL R. ADR app. 16.3.1M(C-1)(b) (2003); D. DEL. R. CIv. PRAC.
16.2(b)(4) (2002); D. ME. Civ. R. 16.3(b)(5), 16.3(c)(4) (2002). For additional rules
regarding the discussion of ADR at pretrial conferences, see Breger, supra note 14, at
app. H.
204 Early case management has been found to contribute to shorter case disposition
times. See infra note 222 and accompanying text. In addition, scheduling a conference
earlier could help reduce delay that might arise if attorneys refrain from discussing ADR
and settlement until the conference. See Robert J. MacCoun, Unintended Consequences
of Court Arbitration: A Cautionary Tale from New Jersey, 14 JUST. Sys. J. 229, 241
(1991) (reporting that attorneys did not conduct negotiations before the scheduled
arbitration hearing).
205 See, e.g., MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.04(b) (2001); ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 16(g)(2)(C)
(2002). These conferences would not necessarily have to be conducted by judges. See,
e.g., ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 16(g)(2)(C) (2002) (providing for ADR discussion conducted by a
court-appointed ADR specialist); MAIMAN ET AL., supra note 195, at 1-2, 4, 11 (noting
that volunteer lawyer neutrals conducted early mandatory conferences to discuss ADR
options and encourage parties to use them, as well as to discuss parties' positions,
interests, and settlement possibilities).
206 See e.g., MAIMAN, ET AL., supra note 195, at 16 (reporting that the conference's
impact on ADR use could not be ascertained due to the lack of adequate court records,
but "marginally reliable" docket data suggested a possible increase in ADR use). Seventy
percent of the neutrals spent some or a great deal of time discussing ADR options during
the conference, and 57% of attorneys and 76% of parties found the conference "fairly" or
"very" useful in providing information on dispute resolution methods. Id. at 17, 19. The
conferences tended to produce more and somewhat earlier settlements. Id. at 22, 24.
207 See supra, note 192 and accompanying text; see also Craig A. McEwen et al.,
Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in
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help to overcome other barriers to ADR consideration and use. Active court
involvement in ADR consideration could motivate attorneys to become better
informed about ADR.20 8 The conference also could serve educational
functions by providing attorneys with more information on the potential
contributions of ADR processes to case resolution 209 and on selecting an
ADR process to meet the needs of the instant case.210 Importantly, a higher
degree of court involvement makes clear judges' support for ADR and more
fully incorporates ADR into the litigation process, which might change
attorneys' views regarding ADR's appropriateness and usefulness. 211
Knowing they will have to attend a conference might motivate attorneys to
have more serious discussions on their own. 21 2
Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1387 (1995) (noting that lawyers reported
that mandated mediation sessions forced them to prepare the case); MEIERHOEFER, supra
note 44, at 103 (finding that 54% of attorneys in cases that were closed after referral to
court-annexed arbitration but before the hearing said the arbitration referral resulted in
earlier settlement discussions); Karl A. Slaikeu & Ralph H. Hasson, Not Necessarily
Mediation: The Use of Convening Clauses in Dispute Systems Design, 8 NEGOT. J. 331,
332 (1992) (noting that without a mechanism to bring parties to the table to discuss ADR,
"there is the very real possibility that ADR processes will be skipped altogether, or
brought in too late to allow for significant cost savings or for more productive
resolutions").
208 See also, John Haynes, Mediators and the Legal Profession: An Overview,
MEDIATION Q., Spring 1989, at 5, 10 (noting that more lawyers attended ADR training
sessions in states that had mandatory mediation); Welsh & McAdoo, supra note 15, at 11.
Attorneys might be motivated to become better informed about ADR processes if they
knew the judge was going to have the type of discussion described in ADR Conference,
supra note 15.
209 Attorneys might not see how ADR could help resolve a case that they previously
had not been able to settle on their own. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text;
see also, McEwen et al., supra note 207, at 1387-88 ("Attorneys report they were often
mistaken in their predictions about the uselessness of mediation for particular cases.").
For a discussion of how ADR processes can assist negotiation, see Craig A. McEwen,
Improving on Negotiation: The Potential of Mediation, 3 ME. LAW. REV. 11, 18-19
(Sept. 13, 1995); Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers
to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. REsOL. 235, 248-49 (1993); Robert
A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need a Mediator For? ": Mediation's "Value-Added"for
Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 8-14 (1996); DEAN G. PRurrr & PETER J.
CARNEVALE, NEGOTIATION IN SOCIAL CONFLICT 81-99, 169-171 (1993); Sternlight,
supra note 28, at 332-45; ADR Conference, supra note 15, at 171-73, 181-83.
2 10 See generally ADR Conference, supra note 15; McAdoo, supra note 4, at 443
(reporting that attorneys appreciated judges who helped them select the right ADR
process for their case).
211 See supra note 189.
212 See also Macfarlane, supra note 11, at 289-90 (reporting that mandatory
mediation led to earlier and more intensive settlement talks in order to avoid the
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In addition, the conference might help reduce some cognitive biases such
as optimistic overconfidence and reactive devaluation that otherwise might
limit ADR use. For instance, a suggestion to use a particular ADR process is
more likely to be received favorably if it comes from the neutral conducting
the conference than from the other side,213 increasing the likelihood that
ADR will be used. Further, even when both parties are willing to consider
ADR, it can be difficult for them to reach that decision at the same point in
time or to agree on the many details of which process should be used when,
conducted by whom, using what approach. 214 The neutral conducting the
conference can assist the parties in negotiating these details, thus facilitating
their use of ADR.
An early ADR conference might need to include the discussion of
discovery issues in order to facilitate ADR use and to expedite the resolution
of cases. 215 Attorneys' real or perceived need for information can lead them
to delay their consideration of ADR as well as to reject its use.2 16 Thus, if a
conference addressed attorneys' information needs in conjunction with
discussing ADR processes, attorneys might be more willing to use ADR. In
addition, because studies have found that ADR use was accompanied by little
mediation session). But cf. MacCoun, supra note 204, at 241.
213 See also Ross, supra note 31, at 29, 41.
214 Wissler et al., supra note 11, at 299-300, 308; McAdoo, supra note 4, at 470
q.27 (finding that 54% of attorneys had at least one case in which they and opposing
counsel could not agree on which ADR process was appropriate); McAdoo & Hinshaw,
supra note 5, at 581 q.28 (reporting that 24% of attorneys had at least one case in which
they and opposing counsel could not agree on which ADR process was appropriate);
Davis, supra note 45, at 741, 748 (finding that personal injury plaintiffs and defendants
are not both highly motivated to settle at the same point during negotiations, except
shortly before trial); see also Mahan, supra note 41, at 45 (noting that problems inherent
in designing rules to which both sides must agree can defeat an attempt to use ADR, even
when both sides want to); Slaikeu & Hasson, supra note 207, at 332 (suggesting that
contracts include a generic dispute resolution clause providing for a third party to meet
with the parties after negotiations have broken down to help them select a dispute
resolution process and provider).
215 See also McAdoo, supra note 4, at 442-43; HYMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 163-
64; Folberg et al., supra note 1, at 397.
2 16 See Rogers & McEwen, supra note 4, at 842-43, 863 (describing attorneys'
perceived information needs, how a change in incentives regarding discovery increased
mediation use, and how mediation use led to informal information exchanges instead of
formal discovery); HYMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 89, 161, 164 (attorneys actually
learned little about the merits or value of the case from the negotiation process). The
present study's findings that attorneys who were more likely to discuss settlement early
also were more likely to discuss ADR early, and that business attorneys were more likely
to have early settlement and ADR discussions than were personal injury attorneys, might
suggest that the timing of discussions was in part affected by information needs.
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change in attorneys' discovery practices,217 addressing issues of structuring
or limiting discovery at an early ADR conference might help to reduce delay
and costs even in cases that use ADR.
3. Conclusion
Based on the limited empirical evidence available to date, requiring
attorneys to both assess ADR options with clients and confer about using
ADR with opposing counsel seems to hold promise as a means to increase
voluntary ADR use. Mandatory discussion rules that address many of the
barriers to voluntary ADR use discussed in this Article are likely to be more
effective in increasing ADR use than are those that address fewer barriers.
However, discussion rules cannot address all of the factors, particularly the
economic and strategic incentives thought to limit attorneys' or litigants'
interest in ADR. 218
The empirical studies of attorneys' ADR discussions and use do not
provide evidence as to whether increased ADR use is likely to achieve the
underlying goals of earlier and better settlements. Although attorneys believe
that ADR, at least in some cases, produces earlier and more creative
settlements, 219 more "objective" empirical findings comparing ADR to
litigation are mixed. 220 As other research has demonstrated, aspects of ADR
217 McAdoo, supra note 4, at 432; McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 515-16;
Stevens H. Clarke & Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Public Sponsorship of Private Settling:
Court-Ordered Civil Case Mediation, 19 JUST. SYS. J. 311, 332 (1997).
218 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text; see also Davis, supra note 45, at
748-49 (noting that insurers are not interested in earlier settlement because they derive
equal or greater benefits from strategies other than reasonable early offers); Goodpaster,
supra note 11, at 236 ("Unless reforms address the economic structures and incentives
behind litigation, simply making alternative dispute resolution services available or
mandating them may not have the desired effect.").
2 19 See supra, notes 44, 102 and accompanying text; see also, McAdoo, supra note
4, at 472 q.37 (finding that 31% of attorneys chose mediation because it increased the
potential for creative solutions); McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 5, at 584 q. 37 (finding
that 23% of attorneys chose mediation because it increased the potential for creative
solutions).
220 See, e.g., Wissler, supra note 44, at 669; Deborah R. Hensler, Court-Annexed
Arbitration, in ADR AND THE COURTS 23, 37-38 (Erika S. Fine & Elizabeth S. Plapinger
eds., 1987) [hereinafter Court-Annexed Arbitration]; Deborah Henlser, Arbitration and
the Pace of Litigation, in THE PACE OF LITIGATION: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 129,
129-137 (Jane W. Adler et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter Pace of Litigation); Herbert
Kritzer, Arbitration and the Pace of Litigation, in THE PACE OF LMGATION: CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS 114, 118-121 (Jane W. Adler et al. eds., 1982); KAKALIK ET AL., supra
note 7, at 34-35; KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 4, at 74; MEIERHOEFER, supra note 44, at 6,
85-89, 95-102; STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 196, at 215-16, 243-44.
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program design, such as the scheduling of ADR referrals and sessions, affect
the timing of settlements. 221 Thus, if attention is not paid to issues of
program structure and availability, an increased willingness to use ADR
might not lead to earlier settlements. And there is some empirical evidence to
suggest that ADR might be less effective in facilitating earlier settlements
than are other approaches to case management, such as early judicial
management, strict scheduling of case events, and discovery cutoffs. 222 Thus,
many questions about the ultimate impact of increased voluntary ADR use
remain to be answered.
221 See, e.g., Wissler, supra note 44, at 671; Court-Annexed Arbitration, supra note
220, at 37-38; Pace of Litigation, supra note 220, at 129-137; STIENSTRA ET AL., supra
note 196, at 215-16, 243-244; MacCoun, supra note 204, at 241; MEIERHOEFER, supra
note 44, at 106.
222 See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 4, at 74, 89; KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 7, at
34-35; see also JOHN GOERDT, EXAMINING COURT DELAY 32-36 (1989) (finding that the
best predictors of faster case processing time included the early scheduling of case
events, strict disposition time goals, and firm trial dates).
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